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Information systems (IS) and new technologies have become an integral part of conducting business 
in today’s world. Almost all organisational sectors have adopted the use of IT systems and 
applications to conduct business and stay competitive in the industry within which they operate. 
However, if not well managed, Information Technology (IT) usage has the potential to expose 
organisations to various threats and vulnerabilities, which can have disastrous consequences. A risk 
mitigation plan is a strategy that helps an organisation to deal with a wide range of unexpected events. 
It covers a long-term plan and strategy that acts as a safety net to both avert a disaster and ensure long 
term survival. 
The purpose of this study is to examine risk factors and associated mitigation strategies in public 
organisation. The case study is the Industrial Development Zone (IDZ) of South Africa. The study 
had two objectives: (i) identify risks associated with IDZ; and (ii) examine how IDZ address risk 
mitigation strategies. A qualitative enquiry was used to carry out the study. Data was collected via 
interviews that were conducted with executive and other key managers from the IDZ. The study 
identified human, organisational and technological risk factors as those that impact mitigation 
strategies in public institutions of South Africa. Proposed contextual solutions for these challenges 
included: (i) the adoption of mobile solutions and on-going research of new mobility solutions so as 
to keep up to date with technological advancements; (ii) the regular update of security policies of the 
organisation so as to align with environmental challenges; and (iii) on-going continuous security 
checks to evaluate and test disaster preparedness. Awareness of tools and applications used to address 
mitigation was seen as a key technological factor.  
This study contributes to a better explanation of the challenges faced by IDZs in the developing 





As organisations continue to adopt, use and rely on technological applications and processes to 
address their business objectives, they are also simultaneously facing new challenges, such as threats 
to cyber security that arise from the use of varying technologies. The “pervasive use of technology 
has caused a critical dependency on IT” (Nfuka & Rusu, 2010) and, as business processes become 
more complex, inherent risk factors are bound to occur that if not addressed could lead to a reduction 
in the overall performance of an organisation (Mangla, Kumar & Barua, 2014). This becomes even 
more of a challenge when considering interdependencies between critical infrastructures “because 
they may allow a failure that is seemingly isolated in one critical infrastructure to cascade to multiple 
critical infrastructures” (Stergiopoulos et al., 2015, p. 34). As a consequence, organisations need to 
be up to date with how best to address these emerging challenges and continuously engage in risk 
mitigation strategies. According to Heiskanen (2012), public institutions in developing countries 
should continuously engage their risk mitigation strategies because they are more vulnerable to 
threats than their developed counterparts. 
This study focuses on public institutions in developing countries because the landscape of developing 
countries places organisations at risk of potential threats which could consequently lead to mistrust 
from investors, suppliers, clients and stakeholders (Hiles, 2004). Ben-David et al. (2011, p. 2) identify 
five forces that shape the security landscape of developing countries: (1) poor ‘security hygiene’, i.e. 
the degree to which up-to-date software patches and recent malware protection are run; (2) unique 
usage patterns not commonly seen in developed economies, such as reliance on mobile technology 
for conducting financial transactions, even in places where credit cards and the web have not yet 
penetrated; (3) novice users who join the internet without knowledge of the risks posed online 
(keeping in mind that disseminating security educational material and tools is extremely challenging); 
(4) the use of pirated software, which may not necessarily pose a security risk but it can be challenging 
to verify that such software is not malicious; and (5) limited understanding of adversaries’ 
perspectives. If not addressed, these factors, including others such as political, organisational and 
cultural concerns, have the potential for significant adverse impacts on organisations. But, if well 
managed “with proper risk management and mitigation, failure could be reduced or negative impact 
and cost minimized” (Nfuka & Rusu, 2010; Franch et al., 2013). 
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Against this background, the purpose of the study is to explore technological risk factors and 
associated mitigation strategies in the public institutions of South Africa. Specifically, the study uses 
the IDZs, are government-created entities responsible for providing state-of-the-art locations for 
ancillary industrial investment (Lewis & Bloch, 1998) as a case study. In the South African context, 
IDZs are perceived as neither having met their goals nor generated anticipated development (Nel & 
Rogerson, 2013). Although challenges associated with their failure have been identified, they have 
not been examined from the perspective of technological risks posed to the IDZ systems (Mbambo, 
2015) as well as associated mitigation strategies. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Organisations in the public sector are now engaging in the use of information communication and 
technology (ICT) in their public service delivery endeavours (Nfuka & Rusu, 2010, p. 2). ICT use 
has several benefits, such as the potential to lower operational costs, increase transparency and 
enhance efficiency and policy effectiveness (Cordella & Tempini, 2015). Despite the benefits, ICT 
use poses some risks – an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has either positive or negative 
effects on the project objectives of an organisation (Cagliano, Grimaldi & Rafele, 2015, p. 3). For 
example, “information is increasingly under threat as vulnerabilities in information technology 
systems that process, store, and transmit information are constantly being exploited for economic, 
espionage and other gains” (Yaokumah, 2015, p. 1318). Organisations can face technological risks 
resulting from an interruption/failure of information systems and equipment that result in harm to 
business processes, their surroundings and the environment. According to Gartner (2013), 40% of 
private, public and variously sized organisations go out of operation within three to five years after 
they experience such risks. If not well managed, risks can develop into a disaster – an occurrence that 
has the potential to cause serious havoc to business and social structures and current business 
processes (Shaluf, Ahmadun & Said, 2003). 
In the IT context, Karkoszka (2014) describes three types of disasters: (i) natural, which are 
biological, geographical, climatological and hydrological disasters; (ii) man-made (technical) 
disasters, which are unexpected interruption from IT infrastructure components, such as networks, 
hardware and software, resulting in a disturbance to daily business process operations; and (iii) 
hybrid, which are a combination of both technical and natural forces. To ensure organisations are 
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protected from risks that can lead to these types of disasters, they need to have mitigation strategies 
in place to address such risks. However, many organisations do not engage in these strategies (AT&T, 
2008) and those that do remain unprotected from technological adversities because of poor 
risk/security policies; lack of awareness, information and staff involvement when developing 
mitigation strategies; as well as a lack of security education and training programmes (Dangare & 
Mangrulkar, 2015). In South Africa, for example, the lack of, or out of date hardware and software; 
inadequate network systems; power failure; and lack of risk mitigation strategies, such as business 
and disaster plans, were potential causes for technological adversity (Stride, 2007). Given that 
“people’s perception of risk and its influencing factors has become an important element of research 
in past decades” (Knuth et al., 2015, p. 581), and the fact that there remain limited studies examining 
public institutions’ risk mitigation strategies, this study seeks to explore how public institutions in a 
developing country, such as IDZs, perceive technological risk and the factors associated with both 
risk and mitigation strategies. 
 
1.3 Context of the Study 
This study is situated in the context of a developing country – South Africa. The government of South 
Africa has dedicated IDZs, created to encourage increased levels of foreign direct investment in the 
economy. The strategic intent of most IDZs is, amongst others, to:  
 Develop and establish a purpose-built world-class industrial park incorporating a delimited 
customs controlled area and linked to ports;  
 Provide quality infrastructure, including information technology centres (ITCs) and transport 
infrastructure, business and utility services; and  
 Attract foreign and local investment projects that will create jobs and which are export-led 
and sustainable, and to make arrangements for and mobilise financial, human and other 
resources for the development of IDZs to promote, foster and mentor Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) and small-, medium- and micro-enterprise (SMME) business 




An IDZ is therefore an “industrial estate linked to an international air or sea port, which might contain 
one or multiple customs controlled areas (CCA) tailored for manufacturing and storage of goods to 
boost beneficiation, investment, economic growth and, most importantly, the development of skills 
and employment in these regions” (http://www.sars.gov.za/). Although IDZs do attract and focus 
investment, some IDZ projects have faced “considerable national criticism from business, other 
provinces, and civil society” (Haines & Hosking, 2012). This is because most African countries that 
have introduced initiatives such as IDZs have not been successful in reaping the acclaimed benefits. 
The challenges that South African IDZs face include, but are not limited to, poor governance and 
quality of infrastructure within the zones. According to Mbambo (2015), power and electricity remain 
major concerns for most IDZs. His findings show that some zones cannot accommodate electricity 
intensive operations and have resorted to focusing on enterprises that consume less electricity. IDZs 
also have challenges related to communication infrastructure, such as cellular phone signals and 
internet connectivity; and some do not have a deep-water port to handle bulk cargo ships or even an 
efficient transportation network linking them to the rest of the economy. IDZs also face structural 
disadvantages of operating in remote, under-resourced, low skilled and isolated locations (Nel & 
Rogerson, 2014). These challenges pose risks that could potentially lead IDZs to fail to generate 
anticipated development. 
 
1.4 Research Goal and Objectives 
The purpose of this study is to examine technological risk factors and associated mitigation strategies 
in Industrial Development Zones (IDZs) of South Africa. The study has the following objectives: 
1) Identify risks associated with IDZ. 
2) Examine how IDZ address risk mitigation strategies. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
The study followed a qualitative approach in order to understand the risks from the perspective of 
IDZ stakeholders and to engage with them on the employed mitigation strategies. A qualitative 
approach allows the researcher to become immersed in the contextual setting and it must therefore be 
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acknowledged that the stakeholder’s reality is socially constructed by the researcher, who is an active 
participant in the research environment and is laden with preconceptions, assumptions and beliefs 
from their cultural settings. The researcher also creates and shapes their own understanding of risk 
and mitigation strategies based on their social context. The study adopts qualitative interviews as a 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a conceptual background to the study. The chapter commences 
with a brief definition of risk in information systems. The next section presents the factors associated 
with risk mitigation, as well as an overview of a technological disaster with a theoretical model on 
disasters and how various disasters can be formed. Thereafter, the chapter reviews risk mitigation 
strategies to elucidate the core role of disaster management in an organisation. The chapter closes 
with a summary. 
 
2.2 Risk in Information Systems 
Every organisation faces risks in its operations. These risks are dependent on the contextual 
challenges the organisation faces. Organisations that rely on ICTs to meet their objectives face 
technological risks, such as the possibility of destruction to a business process and to related 
information, resulting in an accidental event that adversely impacts the availability of the information 
system (Vernim & Reinhart, 2016). Understanding the cause of these risks has been of great concern 
for researchers and practitioners alike because after one understands the cause, one can provide 
mitigation strategies to address risk factors. Risks can emanate from both within and outside of the 
organisation (Aghili, 2010). 
External forces, such as market pressure, institutional regulation and sociocultural factors can pose 
potential risks to an organisation. For example, organisations situated in contexts with a weak 
institutional framework for the adoption and use of mature ICT related innovations pose security and 
privacy concerns for both consumers and the organisation (Molla-Adankew, Molla & Licker, 2005). 
The general infrastructure, such as transportation and ICT, has been reported as potentially 
detrimental to the smooth running of ICT related systems. For example, in Ethiopia and Nigeria, the 
lack of reliable power supply is noted as a key challenge for the adoption of sophisticated solutions 
and the smooth running of online services, such as e-banking (Apulu & Latham, 2011, p. 72). The 
more sophisticated and unpredictable the external environment becomes, specifically with reference 
to technological innovation, the more at risk an organisation becomes because “today’s strongly 
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connected, global networks have produced highly interdependent systems that we do not understand 
and cannot control well. These systems are vulnerable to failure at all scales, posing serious threats 
to society; even when external shocks are absent. As the complexity and interaction strengths in our 
networked world increase, human-made systems can become unstable, creating uncontrollable 
situations even when decision-makers are well-skilled, have all data and technology at their disposal, 
and do their best” (Helbing 2013, p. 51). 
Most studies have shown that external pressures have great influence on how organisations embark 
on ICT and related innovation and can subsequently influence how the organisation responds to risks. 
This study focuses on internal factors that pose a risk to an organisation as it is well established that 
at least half of the breaches to information systems emanate from the organisation itself (Spears & 
Barki, 2010), and due to the fact that information technology related projects have a long history of 
failing (Bakker & Leiter, 2010). To this end, risk management has become a key area through which 
organisations try to provide mitigating solutions to potential risk factors before a disaster occurs 
(Shaluf, Ahmadun & Said, 2003). 
 
2.3 Internal Factors Associated with Risks of Information Systems 
Internal factors are commonly associated with top management support, communication and sharing, 
risk awareness and know-how, mitigation strategies, policy implementation and technological 
factors. These are discussed in the following sub sections. 
 
2.3.1 Top management support 
A successful project in IS has the backing of management who provide financial resources and other 
related resources, such as human resources, for its execution. Top management support has been 
reported as an advantage to prevent critical risk issues and provides structure to policies and tools 
(Werlinger, Hawkey & Beznosov, 2009). Hausmann and Williams (2015) suggest that these policy 
structures and tools allow top management to focus on critical issues within the organisation and 
enable them to prioritise their limited time and give support to IS projects. With a structured 
communication mechanism, this further allows management to collaborate with employees on 
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identifying specific risk issues that the company may experience, without risk of confusion and loss 
of productivity (Hausmann et al., 2015). 
Top management support defines the collaboration mechanism between them and employees as 
essential for the success of any project initiative of the organisation (Helbing, 2013). Therefore, 
applying a balanced management approach, such as a top-down and a bottom-up approach 
concurrently, rather than using the one-sided approach of top-down, will enhance collaboration 
between management and employees (Hausmann et al., 2015).  
The consequence of not having management support for a mitigation strategy is the risk of no budget 
being allocated to initiate the strategy (Helbing, 2013). This will minimise the chances of project 
success and prevent its implementation (Vernim & Reinhart, 2016). In addition, if there is no 
management support of a strategy, when a crisis does occur management will be less likely to 
interfere, the strategy will not receive cooperation; people will obstruct its implementation and will 
not use the new system or continuity plan (Vernim et al., 2016). 
 
2.3.2 Communication and sharing of information 
Whilst management support is critical for project success, it is important that communication 
processes within the organisation are well defined for information flow between organisational 
members. Lack of information sharing and communication has been associated with the development 
of risk factors. Järveläinen (2013), for example, reports that although some organisations do have risk 
mitigation strategies, they fail to adequately communicate these to the rest of the organisational 
members. This lack of communication can lead the organisation to become vulnerable to potential 
threats. Recurring organisational weaknesses due to human factors, together with the inflexibility of 
an organisational hierarchy that results in a failure to reveal important information, or where 
information is made available to those who do not understand its significance, with issues between 





2.3.3 Risk awareness and know-how 
According to Dangare and Mangrulkar (2015), disasters can be influenced by employees’ lack of 
awareness, skill, familiarity and exposure. Organisations need to engage in constant communication, 
and regular awareness and training programs to highlight policies. This can be achieved, for example, 
through a persistent awareness drive. According to Continuity Central (2013), employees are eager 
to learn more about policies on disaster awareness and preparedness and are seeking to increase their 
knowledge in this domain and enhance their skills on preparedness. Such awareness and training 
programs have the potential to reduce perceived risks and increase these levels of preparedness, 
subsequently having an effect on behaviour associated with how risk is managed (Paton, 2003; 
Dangare et al., 2015). In addition, these programs can act as a catalyst to improve employee morale 
because low morale can reduce effectiveness, safety or system performance (Jones et al., 2015). A 
lack of morale can stem from the negative feelings of an employee, such as dissatisfaction and job 
role dislike. Dangare et al. (2014) indicates other factors that could lead to lack of morale and later 
cause technological disaster, such as an unsafe work environment, lack of communication and lack 
of involvement. The growing size of technical systems errors and rapid changes in job roles affect 
the ability of the operative staff to cope with unforeseen disturbances. These factors are worsened by 
human tendencies to blame individuals for bad outcomes (Jones et al., 2015, p. 55). Having 
considered the role of management approaches, communication and risk awareness, and this literature 
review will now discuss mitigation strategies. 
 
2.3.4 Mitigation strategies 
Some organisations do not invest in risk mitigation strategies, such as a continuity plan. A continuity 
plan shows how the organisation can continue operating after a disaster (Jones et al., 2015). Risk 
mitigation employs unique strategies for assessing and measuring the level of risk. Such strategies 
involve careful strategic alignment of protection to information systems and in particular business 
continuity (Järveläinen, 2013). In an organisational context, risk mitigation provides a benchmark to 
better manage an organisational programme by balancing opportunities and risk improvement 
(Continuity Central, 2013). According to Järveläinen (2013), failure to adopt a risk mitigation strategy 
points to a lack of awareness, inadequate documentation and underestimation of serious threats. An 
example could be the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001 at New York’s World Trade Centre, where most 
10 
 
organisations with mitigation strategies in place were able to continue with operations after the 
disaster (Continuity Central, 2013). 
According to Continuity Central (2013), 58% of all system downtime, data loss and malfunctioning 
of financial services and telecommunications is caused by the lack of a continuity plan. Continuity 
Central (2013) found that almost all complex systems are a form of production (daily business 
activities) and listed five basic elements – and agents – for a successful productive system: 
 Functional and line managers, i.e. those who implement the operational strategies. 
 Decision makers, i.e. solution and business architects. 
 Pre-conditions, i.e. a skilled and knowledgeable workforce. 
 Productive activities, i.e. human activities required to deliver the right product at the right 
time. 
 Defences, i.e. where the productive activities encompass exposure to threats, both the human 
and mechanical elements of the system must be made available with adequate safeguards to 
prevent injury, damage or costly outages. 
 
2.3.5 Policy implementation 
Weak policies associated with IS use can have negative consequences for the organisations. For 
example, policy failure is defined as an inappropriate organisational behaviour that reduces safety 
and effectiveness of the system. It consists of managers’ lack of experience, employee morale and 
strategic business pressure leading employees to neglect safety issues (Jones et al., 2015). According 
to Werlinger et al. (2009), revising security policies provides a framework that can be followed by 
all staff and to which they can also contribute using their own experience. This helps organisations 
to minimise risks and allows them to respond quickly. These risks are usually issues such as insecure 
use of the internet, revealing information to unauthorised sources, sharing company information with 
unknown people, failure to revise server passwords, policy not being followed and systems being left 




2.3.6 Technological factors 
Technological factors relate to Perrow’s (1967) theory, which states that no matter how safe a device, 
there is an inevitable possibility of fault and, therefore, there is no such thing as a risk-free area, 
machine-driven agent or perfect individual (Sagan, 2004, p. 17). Organisations are complex, and their 
IT systems increase this complexity because IT systems are complex due to their interdependence. 
System interdependency can lead to a major system failure. Technical integrity is a process, 
procedural, assurance and verification function that ensures that a process and systems meet their 
requirements under stated conditions (Continuity Central, 2013). Organisations often use backup 
procedures as the technical integrity to shield themselves against unforeseen disasters. As a result, 
organisations are able to predict measure and eliminate any malfunctioning practises that may take 
place in the system and processes (Werlinger et al., 2009). Because IT systems have inherent control 
mechanisms that can potentially detect and predict threats, the very complexity of a system can result 
in the organisation being over confident, complacent and in denial in the face of imminent disaster, 
and thus being prone to ignoring the warning signs. Due to this, organisations are cautioned against 
having full confidence in IT systems without having mitigation strategies in place (Werlinger et al., 
2009; Hiles, 2004). For example, according to Continuity Central (2013), 58% of organisations 
without technical integrity could not survive or retrieve lost information after a disaster. This later 
causes distrust and a bad reputation with stakeholders, suppliers and business partners. It is therefore 
advised that organisations have risk mitigation strategies in place to address system failures or 
potential threats. 
Turner (1976) developed a model (Figure 1) to describe the sequence of events associated with the 
development of technological (man-made) disasters (Shaluf, 2008). The latest literature of Hollnagel 
(2014) describes Turner’s sequence of event stages, as they are still applicable as organisations 
continuously experience recurring man-made disasters. According to Hollnagel (2014), these stages 
not only describe the sequence of events but also serve as a guideline as to how a man-made disaster 
can be formed and how they can have negative impact on the organisation. Stage 1 of the model is 
the notional normal starting points where the organisation and employees adhere to norms and 
standards, and operations function as normal (Hollnagel, 2014, p. 3). Therefore, employees are still 
adjusting to standards, procedures and policies of the organisation and they adhere to it. According 
to Lewis and Liu (2017), one unique common habit of employees is that when they become too 
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comfortable in their environment they become reluctant, i.e. they neglect organisational standards, 
do not adhere to norms and operational functions and ignore policies. 
 
Figure 2.1: Turner’s Sequence of Event Model 
Stage 2 relates to the incubation period wherein errors occur and accumulate. Hollnagel (2014) 
postulates that man-made disasters frequently start small and go unnoticed. This stage relates to poor 
operational and managerial decisions which amount to an incubation period. Over a long period, 
problems accumulate until these explode into the form of an accident. This stage has the potential to 
hide warning signs. These can be difficult to notice and failure can exist unnoticed in systems for a 
long period of time, which may lessen the opportunity to introduce interventions and a risk mitigation 
strategy (Hollnagel, 2014). Therefore, the organisation subsequently finds itself in the disaster stage. 
Stage 3 is characterised by repetitive patterns that serve as a warning and which, if ignored, align to 
create a disaster (Hollnagel, 2014). It is at this stage where ignored warnings accumulate to trigger 
disaster. This is a stage where warning signs can be misread, evidence can be misinterpreted and 
where organisations fall into an incompetent trap (Hollnagel, 2014, p. 4). During this period, minor 
events can interact and accumulate to produce major system failure. 
Stage 4 describes the actual occurrence of a disaster. A disaster is generally described as an 
interruption of normal business processes resulting from the interruption of the IT infrastructure 
components used to support them. This may be caused by minor events that were ignored until they 
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became a disaster. This includes hardwires, software, networks and information systems, as well as 
data itself (Hollnagel, 2014). Typically the nature of this event is that it disrupts business from 
operating as normal to the extent that monetary losses are incurred (Hollnagel, 2014). From this 
perspective, a disaster is defined as an event resulting from the inability of an organisation to provide 
critical business functions for a period of time, and which causes them to move from normal operating 
procedures to employ a mitigation strategy procedure (Shaluf, 2008). 
Stage 5 is associated with activities that bring an organisation to the point where it may resume basic 
operational functioning. At this stage the organisation employs recovery mitigation strategies as far 
as man-made disasters are concerned. Mitigation strategy resides in resilience engineering. Resilience 
is a recovery system’s ability to effectively adjust to hazardous events rather than disruption and 
surprises (Hollnagel, 2014). According to Hollnagel (2014), the following important functions of 
mitigation strategy management are required to be effective: 
 Perform risk analysis and assessment for IT services in order to identify the threats, 
vulnerabilities and assets; 
 Planning mitigation strategies and assessing cost; and 
 Certifying solutions that are not based on compliance but rather on demonstrating recovery 
readiness and accountability. 
Once these mitigation management processes are in place, the organisation is expected to design a 
solution, certify it, and implement it in accordance with the information yielded by the 
abovementioned processes. 
Finally, Stage 6 describes the process of adjustment, in which activities are focused on attaining full 
operational business functioning. According to Hollnagel (2014), this stage suggests that the designed 
mitigation strategy can be effective only when the organisation is business-driven. Recovery times 
and recovery points must be driven by organisational recovery culture, not only by IT capability 
(Hollnagel, 2014). IT capabilities should evolve to achieve business recovery requirements. 
Therefore, cultural adjustment of mitigation strategy is a continuous process that needs to be 
maintained and entrenched in the organisation (Hollnagel, 2014).  
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Wright (2010) and Hiles (2004), building on Turner’s 1976 sequence of events model, see a failure 
of foresight and absence of knowledge and information amongst the groups and/or individuals as 
causes of a disaster. Turner (1976), in his work on various disasters, notes a number of features and 
similarities common to organisations that form and contribute to man-made disasters. Jones et al. 
(2015) develop this idea in their argument that in any organisation learning from accidents or mistakes 
reinforces the desire to improve management practices and rectify mistakes. Common features and 
similarities of man-made disasters (Figure 2) include: (a) rigidities in institutional beliefs, which 
create and atrophy a particular culture; (b) distracting decoy phenomena; (c) neglect of outside 
complaints; (d) multiple information-handling difficulties; (e) exacerbation of hazards by strangers; 
(f) failure to comply with regulations; and (g) a tendency to minimise emergent danger (Turner, 1976; 
Shaluf, 2008). In Figure 2.2, Heiskanen (2012) elaborates on the incubation stage in Turner’s model 
of five stages that leads to a man-made disaster. 
 
Figure 2.2: Incubation stage of man-made disasters 
Turner’s model (1976) and Heiskanen’s incubation model (2012) comprise seven stages in the 
process of generating a technological disaster:  
1) Rigidities in perception 
The organisational cultural setting and intuitional factors inhibit the perception of a disaster. In 
particular, failure of perception may be created and reinforced by a set of organisational cultural and 
subcultural beliefs. Turner (1976) suggests that all organisations cultivate within the constituent of 
constant culture, which is related to their environment and tasks. Although part of organisational 
effectiveness stems from their development of such a culture, this can also lead to collective blindness 
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to important issues, which might drive them to a disaster. Moreover, if these beliefs and culture are 
long established within the organisation, they will inevitably influence the perceptions and attitudes 
of staff (Turner, 1976). 
2) Organisational exclusivity  
Turner (1976) suggests that defiance of an organisation by choosing to ignore outside warnings can 
result in disaster. In his study, Turner (1976) gives an example of the concern of an outsider individual 
who foresees a hazard that ultimately leads to disaster. Because the organisation developed a culture 
of ‘We know our flaws better than outsiders when it comes to the dangers of the situation with which 
we are dealing’, the organisation was facing dismissal from the local municipality as well as a bad 
reputation. 
3) Information difficulties 
Turner’s 1976 model suggests that information difficulties are sometimes caused by an ill-structured 
organisation, which militates against the organisation’s capability to handle a problem. According to 
Turner (1976), to solve this the organisation needs to expand its resources in such a way that the 
process of identifying and tackling the problem is not ill structured. Furthermore, Turner (1976) 
suggests that information difficulties can occur when inaccurate, misleading or conflicting 
information is communicated from one person to another and important information does not reach 
the relevant people. Even if relevant personnel receive information, the full import is often not 
perceived by the relevant person because s/he fails to see its significance. 
4) Failure to comply with regulations 
Turner (1976) suggests that this happens when regulations, although satisfactorily implemented, are 
not complied with simply because they are out-dated and not easy to apply in changed social, 
technological and cultural settings. 
5) Minimising emergent danger 
In this stage, Turner (1976) sees recurring problems occurring when an organisation fails to observe 
the magnitude of danger, even if the danger is clearly visible. Turner (1976) notes that even if the 
danger is seen and acknowledged, no one seems to take responsibility for averting the danger; instead 
everyone in the organisation plays the blame game. 
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6) Decoy phenomena 
In this stage, Heiskanen (2012) explains that distraction and confusion occur about roles when 
planning a recover approach. According to Turner (1976), this is caused by a single unit involvement 
when planning a recovery plan. As suggested by Heiskanen (2012), a recovery plan should be cross 
functional and roles must be clearly identified. 
7) Exacerbation hazard 
Heiskanen (2012) suggests that this happens when danger occurs and no one knows what to do due 
to a lack of recovery in place. Sometimes a recovery plan is present but, due to a lack of 
communication or information sharing, people become unaware if there is a recovery plan in place 
or not. Therefore, when the crisis strikes no one knows what to do. 
 
2.4 Risk Mitigation Strategies 
Risk mitigation is the action taken by an organisation to reduce adverse impact (Talluri, Kull, Yildiz 
& Yoon, 2013). Lewis et al. (2017) and Jones et al. (2015) see mitigation as being an essential internal 
risk control for any organisation to safeguard itself from the negative effects of risk. It holds a unique 
strategy that is closely related to and matches the business profile (Talluri et al., 2013) and allows 
organisation to assess risks and predict vulnerabilities and give them the ability of what to do and 
how should a disaster occur. Especially in the public sector, investors, suppliers and clients develop 
trust and confidence when a mitigation strategy is in place (Karkoszka, 2014). A study by Pepitone 
(2012) shows that, any organisation with a mitigation strategy has the ability to sustain any terror 
event, as well as gains trust and good company reputation. Ideally, a mitigation strategy is not one 
overwhelming activity, it can rather be seen as a phased activity, involving an information systems 
continuity plan, disaster recovery, incidence response planning, business continuity planning and risk 
management (Pepitone, 2012). Each activity is unique, requiring a different skill set, specific 
documentation and planning. Therefore, the end result should be a set of documentation that provides 
a quick reference for responding to a disaster (Talluri et al., 2013). When done properly, these 
mitigation strategies will prevent many common crises situations, minimise the impact of actual 
disasters and speed up the return to normal operations (Talluri et al., 2013, p. 258). 
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Risk mitigation strategies are essentially an approach to putting into practice informat ion systems’ 
continuity plans to protect the organisation’s critical information (Bakker & Leiter, 2010). To address 
risk mitigation, organisations adopt a business continuity management (BCM) approach that assists 
them to identify and avoid potential damaging incidents that would have a severe business impact 
(Järveläinen, 2013). It offers a suitable tool for engaging top management in the discussion relating 
to the business implications of different operational incidents that are not necessarily security related 
(Järveläinen, 2013, p. 70). These include antedating organisational risks; ensuring the continuity of 
business operations; shielding critical functions at all times; ensuring effective, quick and efficient 
time to respond to a disaster; and ensuring a holistic on-going BCM process (Järveläinen, 2013). 
According to Elliott, Swartz and Herbane (2010), the primary objective of BCM is to bring 
confidence to an organisation and to build resilience in ensuring long-term survival in the face of 
rapid changes to business environments, disasters, organisational risk and crises. It further assists 
organisations to study clearly and in detail the worst possible future scenario in terms of how quickly 
the organisation can restore its normal operations, and where and how the organisation would operate 
following a disaster. While the scope of continuity management extends to all business operations, 
Järveläinen (2013) argues that its proactive application in the area of IS could foster its evolution and 
increase the robustness of IT services. 
There are several processes executed under BCM for planning the recovery of general business 
operations in the event of disruption: a business continuity plan (BCP), which focuses on business 
processes rather than IT infrastructure to ensure that an organisation can continue; an IS continuity 
plan (ISCP), which encompasses activities that safeguard IT services and information systems and 
ensure that they carry on in the event of a disaster; a disaster recovery plan (DRP) with the purpose 
to ensure the accuracy and consistency of the data stored in a database in order to restore operations 
faster, thus ensuring the continuity of operations and shielding sensitive information; and an incidence 
response plan (IRP), a sub tool which is meant to protect an organisation’s information assets and 
mitigate damage from incidents should they occur (Best Computer Practices, 2009; Continuity 
Central, 2013). From an IT perspective, several risk mitigation strategies are proposed: an 
organisation provides an ISCP and a DRP with a benchmark to better manage organisational 




2.4.1 Information systems continuity plan (ISCP) 
An ISCP is defined as “a complete process of developing measures and procedures to ensure an 
organisation’s disaster preparedness. This includes ensuring that the organisation would be able to 
respond effectively to a disaster and that their critical business processes can continue as usual” 
(Järveläinen, 2013, p. 70). It includes preparing the organisation to respond effectively to an incident 
at the moment it occurs for the purpose of ensuring the continuity of business operations (Järveläinen, 
2013, p. 70). Heiskanen (2012) advocates that an ISCP be proactive, meaning that it initiates steps in 
advance to ensure that, no matter what happens, an organisation and its operations will not be 
disrupted. Its purpose is not only to forestall disaster but also to assist an organisation to recover from 
damage that has already occurred to the system and infrastructure. Pepitone (2012) concurs with 
Järveläinen (2013) that this plan helps an organisation to recover and resume its normal operations 
and critical processes. An ISCP therefore defines procedures an organisation should have in place to 
prevent interruption of critical services and to ensure that essential functions can continue during and 
after a disaster (Jones et al., 2015). Three phases have been identified that constitute an ISCP, as 
shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: ISCP Phases 
Resolve What critical business processes and supporting equipment does the organisation have? 
How long can each of those processes remain unavailable before the functioning of the 
organisation is seriously or permanently disrupted? 
Are there any options for outsourcing or replacing those processes during the crisis? 
Which partners and suppliers can respond quickly? 
What specific risks do the organisation face and who needs to be involved in developing 
the continuity plan? 
Response Who needs to form part of a disaster response team and who will declare a disaster? 
How will a recovery team communicate? 
How will information be circulated to all employees? 
In the event of any kind of disaster where will people work and with what equipment? 
Rebuild Who will be responsible for the damaged IT infrastructure? 
How will the insurance claims be handled? 
What will be done to maintain the IT systems, servers and productivity levels during and 
after the crisis? 
 
The purpose of the resolve phase is to identify and predict potential disasters, and the preventive 
actions that should be taken. Organisations are required to document the current state, i.e. current 
business process, risk status and how things are currently done in the organisation, and provide 
procedures for on-going pre-empting action to mitigate risks (Heiskanen, 2012). The study of 
Pepitone (2012) suggests that all organisation that have written procedures for routine maintenance 
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activities in and out of the building, with the inclusion of steps to prevent system failure and regular 
system and server inspections, have the ability to resolve any predicted disasters. Having written rules 
will help the organisation by ensuring that if by any chance one of the routine activities, such as an 
off-site server, fails or burns out; at least they know that there are other written rules that can be used, 
such as insuring IT infrastructure (Heiskanen, 2012). It will further reduce the odds of crises and this 
might reduce legal liability should crises occur (Heiskanen, 2012). 
The resolve phase also aims to provide organisations with an integrated defensive and offensive capability 
to deal with their competitive environments. A highly available IT infrastructure that has both people 
and systems residing entirely within the potential impact zone of a single disaster will definitely not 
provide an organisation with the resiliency to maintain operations through a disaster (Järveläinen, 
2013). Järveläinen (2013) posits that many organisations ideally maintain the geographic separation 
of multiple data centres at appropriate distances, and thus have the ability to survive any technological 
events caused by a disaster. While organisations may be able to recover applications to a replicated 
site, if only a limited number of skilled employees are stationed at a recovery station the organisation 
might not be able to recover from an operational perspective (Continuity Central, 2013). For example, 
a travel booking system was disrupted during recent picketing in the public sector but employees 
were able to continue work by going to another location and so the residual effects of the disaster 
were prevented. This relates to the study by Jones et al. (2015) and suggests that organisations should 
take advantage of strengthened physical locations and consider having an alternative work-site with 
strong infrastructure. 
Heiskanen (2012) recommends that once these ISCP phase questions have been addressed, the 
organisation monitors risk, maintains the environment and documents the crises or emergency 
response measures as part of an on-going preventive action to mitigate risks (Pepitone, 2012). 
Järveläinen (2013) argues that in any organisation or business people will come and go, business 
processes will change, technology will improve and change, equipment will be replaced, and all these 
changes will cause risk to transform and migrate. Järveläinen (2013) suggests that an IT unit should 
have written procedures for a backup regimen, continuous security screening and regular IT system 
maintenance procedures. 
During the response phase the organisation needs to know well in advance what to do if it wishes to 
avoid being failing under the weight of a crisis. According to Hiles (2004), organisations should not 
treat this phase as finding a one-size-fits-all solution. They should start by documenting basic 
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response procedures, the people to be involved and contact information for everyone that might need 
to be notified. This fosters a positive situation, as everyone understands what to do, which relates to 
using more than one communication mechanism as some communication mechanisms might not be 
available during major havoc (Lewis et al., 2017). The primary advantage of this is that 
documentation for dealing with the most common situations will be brief and targeted (Lewis et al., 
2017). First responders will know what they need to do to manage these most likely emergencies, as 
it is significant to gain a quick control over small crises quickly so that they will not develop into 
major disasters (Lewis et al., 2017). Once the abrupt crisis situation is stabilised, attention turns 
towards rebuilding and returning to normal. 
The final phase – rebuild – has the main goal of replacing or reconstructing damage that may have 
been caused by a disaster (Lewis et al., 2017). This includes ensuring that the full extent of the damage 
is assessed to avoid long lead-time items that can be ordered in advance to minimise downtime. This 
is where good documentation of all organisation assets is essential (Järveläinen, 2013). Ideally, the 
response and rebuild phases will correspond to some extent so that recovery time can be shortened 
(Heiskanen, 2012). Having documentation and people with skill sets for these efforts will speed up 
and simplify both efforts. 
 
2.4.2 Disaster controls 
According to Heiskanen (2012), risk acknowledgement of risk assessment actions should be taken to 
minimise the risk. Failure to do so will have a negative impact on organisation finances. An example 
from a study of Järveläinen (2013) was when a Parastatile building burnt down in a fire that resulted 
in employees evacuating the building. However, due to strong controls and competent responsible 
personnel they were able to survive. According to Lewis et al. (2017), the organisation survived 
because of the monthly practise or drill they conduct as safety awareness. Types of disaster controls 
are discussed below. 
 
2.4.2.1 Ability to monitor 
Monitoring refers to the ways an organisation looks at opportunities and threats that may happen in 
the short- or long-term both inside and outside of the organisational environment (Hollnagel, 2014, 
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p. 8). A necessity for monitoring is understanding what the organisation is looking for, and monitoring 
for signs of what may happen (Hollnagel, 2014, p. 8). One of the benefits of monitoring is that it 
becomes easier to respond faster or even to pre-emptively. In addition, it enables the organisation to 
address possible changes before they become a reality (Hollnagel, 2014). 
 
2.4.2.2 Ability to respond 
This refers to the organisation knowing what to do when confronted with disruptions and disturbances 
(Hollnagel, 2014, p. 6). This relates to procedures, activities and adjustment of on-going functioning 
to match the new condition (Hollnagel, 2014, p. 6). However, this will require resources being ready 
or flexible enough as it may be necessary for an organisation to change from a state of normal 
operations to a state of readiness (Hollnagel, 2014, p. 6). This points to other concerns, such as the 
availability of resources, the ability to sustain the response for a period of time and the monitoring of 
effect (Hollnagel, 2014). However, it is significant for an organisation to know how the set of events 
has been defined and if the responses are ever revised (Hollnagel, 2014). Yet another concern is how 
readiness to respond is maintained, i.e. how plans are kept up to date and how readiness to respond 
is verified (Hollnagel, 2014). 
 
2.4.2.3 Ability to learn 
Ability to learn is to make use of experiences and change behaviour as a result of this experience 
(Hollnagel, 2014, p. 10). It is a milestone and the core stem of response and monitor (Hollnagel, 
2014). Neither responding nor monitoring can improve unless some kind of learning takes place 
(Hollnagel, 2014, p. 10). According to Lewis et al. (2017), it is undeniable that future performance 
can only be improved if organisations learn from past performance, learn the right lessons from the 
right experience, and learn from what went wrong as well as what went well (Hollnagel, 2014). 
Consistent with that philosophy, Hollnagel (2014) asserts that more can be learned from events with 
serious outcomes, such as unusual crises, threats and disasters. According to the general learning 
theory, effective learning requires three conditions: first, that there is sufficient opportunity to learn. 
Second, there is some similarity between the situation and events. Lastly, it must be possible to 




2.4.2.4 Mobility solution 
The mobility solution allows employees to plan and perform day-to-day business activities away from 
the physical building in the event of infrastructure failure or any form of a disaster (Hollnagel, 2014). 
The more employees can use their mobile devices and applications as a solution to access and share 
corporate resources from anywhere at any time, the better they can collaborate on efficient project 
management in the case of access denial from a building (Ahmad, et al., 2012). These are essential 
tools for conducting work away from the workplace, the idea being that it is easy to respond to 
demand and work functions. Hollnagel (2014) advocates that thinking beyond the physical building 
needs to be proactive, meaning steps should be initiated in advance to ensure that no matter what 
happens an organisation and its operations will not be disrupted. 
 
2.4.3 Risk and disaster management 
Jones et al. (2015) define risk and disaster management as a process involving the investigation of 
the possibilities of losing an IT system and, from this, framing strategies to minimise the damage 
(Järveläinen, 2013). Järveläinen (2013, p. 70) postulates six fundamental concepts that are key to the 
management of risks and disasters. 
(a) Impacts: understanding the consequences of risk occurrence by assessing risk impact and 
benchmarking the mitigation actions. Risk cannot be easily identified and the impacts and causes 
of risks can be distracted by the risk itself (Järveläinen, 2013). Therefore, the attempt to mitigate 
risk is based on measuring risk impact and its probability to occur. According to Jones et al. 
(2015), in many cases less important risks can appear much more threatening and important risks 
can be underestimated. 
 (b) Threat: upon completing a risk assessment, the next step is the identification of how risks can 
impact the organisation and developing a precautionary measurement for reduction of risk. The 
SWOT model by Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel (1998) in the study of Jones et al. (2015, p. 55) 
focuses on scanning the business environment in order to identify the organisational environment. 
Performing risk assessment using the SWOT model is likely to improve the way the organisation sees 
its future for the purpose of minimising risk and impact of risk (Jones et al., 2015). Similarly, an 
23 
 
organisation without risk assessment will likely be exposed to a higher level of risk when compared 
to one with a risk assessment (Ozkazanc & Yuksela, 2015, p. 752). Having a risk assessment using 
SWOT analysis enhances the organisational capability to resist disasters and recover. 
(c) Resilience: this is the ability to absorb external pressure and become stronger. When risks are 
known and mitigation plans are in place, vulnerabilities are reduced and this enables the company to 
survive. Heiskanen (2012) argues that organisational capability of resilience can be accomplished by 
integrating the mitigation strategy with its components, such as DRP, IRP and BCM. In doing so, 
Ozkazanc & Yuksela,  2015 have seen a potential role to integrate the mitigation activities of the 
organisation where risk mitigation is designed to improve resilience since it puts into planning 
approaches, structure and skills in multi-functional. This will strengthen resilience by shoring up 
areas of vulnerability (Ozkazanc & Yuksela, 2015). 
(d) Effectiveness: the recovery plan should be tested and communicated to everyone so that they 
know what to do when disaster strikes. The literature of Ozkazanc & Yuksela, 2015 indicates that the 
effectiveness of the mitigation approach relies on performing a number of activities and encourages 
people to be involved in the mitigation strategy through periodic testing, updating, training and 
maintenance. Everyone within the organisation must be involved in the mitigation strategy for it to 
be effective (Jones et al., 2015). These activities involve creating teams, assigning roles and 
responsibilities, developing backup and disaster recovery plans, performing risk analysis, testing 
plans, and training, maintaining and updating developed plans (Continuity Central, 2013). 
(e) Response: examining and deciding on the how of the recovery. This should include all responsible 
personnel from different departments giving input as to how the organisation should recover. This 
phase involves coordination and collaboration between all organisation units and management levels 
(Continuity Central, 2013). It therefore requires a state of change and is about new way of responding 
and reacting to unexpected incidents. Therefore, perceiving the response tactic as being merely a 
planning exercise is not adequate. It has to be a forward thinking, daily activity that emphasises 
flexibility and technological integration that should be embedded into the culture of the organisation 
(Elliott, Swartz & Herbane, 2010). 
(f) Interests: protection of all stakeholder interests. This relates to gaining confidence from 
stakeholders and clients by ensuring that the organisation takes measures of recovery against 
vulnerabilities (Jones et al., 2015). This builds a good organisational reputation and competency in 
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the industry in which the organisation operates. Therefore, investing in risk management promotes 
confidence not only in the organisation but to relevant stakeholders as well (Järveläinen, 2013). 
There are other additional key principles that relate to the abovementioned principles. The 
relationship between these is that they enable organisations to ensure the continuity of data, 
technology and services with the management of risk and disaster. According to Continuity Central 
(2013), best practise is that all organisations adopt as many continuity principles as they can to ensure 
that they are safely covered, so that if one of the principles is not well defined they will still be 
protected. Table 2.2 discusses the six key principles associated with risk and disaster management 
cycle. 
Table 2.2: Six key principles of IS continuity (Järveläinen, 2013; Continuity Central, 2013) 
Principles Definition Example 
Protect  Protecting the ISC or ITC environment is 
critical for maintaining the desired levels of 
system availability for an organisation. 
Processes and plans to defend against threats, 
i.e. ensuring a backup so that a secondary copy 
of data is always available. 
Detect  Detecting incidents at the earliest opportunity 
will minimise impact on services, reduce 
recovery effort and preserve quality of services. 
Use of monitoring and alert tools to detect 
capacity deficiencies, such as running out of 
memory or storage. 
React  Reacting to an incident in an appropriate 
manner will enable efficient recovery and 
minimise the incidence and length of down 
time. 
The predefined procedure the operator has in 
place to communicate alerts to the relevant 
parties for them to fix a threat and, if they do 
not, the procedures to escalate the issues in 
order to forestall the threat. 
Recover  Recovery of services should be performed in a 
controlled and predetermined fashion. 
Activities that must be performed in a 
controlled and predetermined fashion to bring 
the business processes and systems back to a 
point of operation. 
Resume  A full understanding of the recovery priorities, 
as well as the recovery point and recovery time 
objectives, assigns priority to the reinstatement 
of the most critical services. 
Enkindling the activities, plans and 
documentation used to re-commence business 
operation.  
Return  The process of returning from disaster mode to 
normal operations is often neglected by 
organisations. All IS continuity plans should 
have an existing strategy that allows them to 
vacate their ITC disaster recovery centre when 
the time comes. 
The process of going back to normal operations 
and returning to the facilities that were 
damaged during the disaster. 
 
In addition, having established that risk and disaster can be better managed by adopting key principles 
and concepts that can minimise system instability and data retention, it can be observed that BCM is 
part of the risk mitigation strategies that ensure the continuity of business, ensuring effectiveness and 
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The literature review identified seven internal factors that are key to the continuous operation of IT 
systems after a threat or disaster has occurred. These include communication, management support, 
risk awareness, expertise, adequate resource allocation, policy implementation and technology. From 
a technical perspective, IT systems are to conform to technical integrity for them to support 
continuous operation of IT systems after a threat or disaster has occurred. The organisation further 
needs to develop and continue engagement in the implementation of as ISCP that will ensure the 
organisation recovers and resumes its normal operations and critical processes after a threat. Figure 
3 summarises the key elements for examining internal factors associated with the process of managing 
risk in an organisation and will be used as a guide to examine the phenomenon of disaster 
management in this study. 
 




According to the model, an organisation needs to pay attention to risk factors whilst simultaneously 
engaging in the cycle of risk management. Failing to engage in a risk management process is in itself 
a risk factor. Given that organisations are affected by contextual factors, within each phase of the risk 
management process the organisation should be cognisant of the need to readdress risk factors that 
could have changed due to a volatile environment. For example, in the protect phase the organisation 
does not only provide measures for protecting the IT systems from potential threats, such as providing 
IT security controls, but also examines other risk factors, such as resource allocation for the protection 
process and expertise availability for implementing and maintaining protection measures. 
The above model relates to the incubation stage from Turner’s model (1976) where information 
difficulty is a critical element. This is a stage where certain events go unnoticed and misunderstood 
by management and employees of an organisation because of incorrect assumptions and difficulties 




3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter illustrates how the researcher carried out the study. It details the techniques for 
collecting, measuring and analysing data when conducting research (Creswell & Clark, 2007). The 
aim of this chapter is to discuss the methodology adopted for the study. It comprises the philosophy 
and approach, data collection, sample, data analysis, limitation, timeline and summary, and each will 
be briefly discussed. 
 
3.2 Philosophy and Approach 
This study is deductive in nature and follows an interpretive approach. An interpretive approach is 
based on the assumption of the state of flux of an experience and has an inherent logic that requires 
the social scientist to grasp the ‘subjective meaning’ of action (Partington, 2002; Bryman & Bell, 
2007). With subjective meaning, it is recommended that every individual build his or her own 
existence. Usually, interpretivism relates to experience and focuses on the way people make sense of 
the world (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 2008). Interpretive researchers attempt to understand 
phenomena through accessing the meanings that participants assign to them. According to this 
research philosophy, data is people’s constructions of others’ edifices regarding the ways in which 
their compatriots behave and the reasons for their actions (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). 
The rationale for choosing this research philosophy is that there are few studies that pay attention to 
industrial development organisations. The majority of studies have not set a focus on the IDZ sector; 
they set their focus on private companies, thus resulting in limited literature being available on 
mitigation strategies for IDZs. Although a number of studies have been conducted on mitigation 
strategies, such as the information systems continuity plan, not much attention has been given to 
factors that affect the continuous function of the organisation in terms of mitigation strategies. 
Therefore, an interpretive approach will allow the researcher to interact with experienced participants 
who will be able to detail their work or expertise in risk mitigation. The researcher will be able to 
gather rich in-depth information from various opinions through interacting, and assessing body 
language and observation. Information gathered will be tied back to the literature and will validate 
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meanings. Another reason for adopting an interpretive approach is the researcher’s assumption about 
reality that people’s experiences are different. The people involved in the researched phenomena can 
construct reality. The study takes an interpretive stance as it aims to explore the negative continuous 
function of IDZs in depth, which can be expressed through social constructs, such as language, 
consciousness and shared meaning (Creswell, 1994; Myers, 2009). 
 
3.3 Strategy 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2000) describe a research strategy as a general method that a 
researcher employs to answer the research question. Research strategies are classified by Easterby-
Smith et al. (2008) into the following categories: case study, action research and survey research. 
Action research is a strategy that allows a researcher to collaborate with practitioners and therefore 
requires the researcher to be part of the organisation in which the research is being conducted 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 2008; Saunders et al., 2000). Survey research strategy is more positivistic 
because it helps researchers collect large volumes of data from sizable samples and to generalise the 
findings (Hair, Babin, Money & Samouel, 2003). 
For the purpose of this research, a case study approach was selected. A case study is a method that 
seeks to describe a particular case in detail and develop a theory from that approach (Saunders et al., 
2000). A case study strategy offers the researcher the opportunity to capture the richness of in-depth 
information, since it enables collecting various opinions and attitudes, which assist the researcher to 
achieve research objectives. It also provides an opportunity for the researcher to examine how a 
difficult set of situations comes together to produce a particular manifestation. Table 3 summarises 
the advantages of using a case study as a research strategy. 
Table 3.1: The advantages of using a case study  
Advantage Reference 
Ability to apply a single case or multiple cases for better generalisation of results. Yin (1994) 
The ability to learn more about poorly understood situations. Bryman (2004) 
The opportunity for extensive analysis of many specific details in comparison with other 
research methods. 
Kumar (1996) 






Adopting a case study approach renders this research of possible benefit because it has the potential 
to capture in-depth richness of information and augment the present dearth and general unavailability 
of information about risk mitigation issues in South Africa. South African IDZ organisations rely on 
statistics from other countries, which reveal and record causes of disaster in these countries 
(Karkoszka, 2014). In developed countries, such as Europe and the USA, and developing countries, 
including other African countries, conditions are different from South African IDZs. South African 
IDZs have less stable infrastructure and fewer skills available to ensure system stability and 
continuity. The problem facing South African IDZ research is the relative unavailability of reliable 
studies and sources (Stride, 2007). This could be due to the lack of a regulatory body and a single 
source of reliable and unbiased information. Thus, adopting a case study has the potential to add a 
level of information visibility, which could prove valuable to researchers and guide future research. 
 
3.4 Research Design 
Ghauri and Gronhaug (2005) classify research designs into three categories: descriptive, exploratory 
and causal. Cooper and Schindler (2006) claim that exploratory research is suitable when the area of 
research is not clear – a new field – or if it is not clearly identified. The purpose of an exploratory 
research design is for the researcher(s) to learn something new about the phenomenon and this occurs 
when a researcher has observed something or has an idea or hypothesis/theory and seeks to understand 
it more. Cooper et al. (2006) argue that the purpose of an exploratory research design is to determine 
if what is being observed might be explained by an existing theory. Therefore, based on the 
aforementioned background and due to the relatively small scope of available literature on mitigation 
strategy, such as that dealing with ISC in IDZ organisations, the researcher is able to observe and 
capture data in an area where ideas are not clearly defined or identified in literature and thus make 
this research exploratory. 
 
3.5 Data Collection 
Data collection is a process through which a researcher collects information needed to answer the 
research question or problem (Saunders et al., 2000). This research employs a qualitative data 
collection approach because the researcher seeks direct interaction with participants on a one-to-one 
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basis. The benefit of the qualitative approach for the research is that the information gathered is rich 
and has deeper insight into the phenomenon under study (Saunders et al., 2000). 
 
3.5.1 Sample 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) describe how research in social sciences involves determining the 
research population and sample. A population is any group that shares common traits and the sample 
is a subset of the population from which evidence is obtained (Black, 1999). The primary targeted 
sample for this research is the IT department at IDZ Organisation X, since this department is the heart 
of innovation, strategy and an ISCP. However, the sample is expanded to cover all departments. As 
Järveläinen (2013), points out that the disaster recovery plan (DRP) and ISCP must be cross-
functional as ideas of personnel across different departments need to be included. The researcher 
believes that these ideas have the potential to enhance the validation of the research. The IT 
department’s population comprises ten (10) participants as follows: a chief information officer (CIO), 
IT managers, IT project managers, a solution architect, an ICT system administrator, a business 
process analyst (BPA), a business analyst (BA), a developer, and two Oracle support team members. 
In addition to the targeted sample, the personnel from different departments consists of six 
participants as follows: two (2) executive managers (EMs), an account manager and two (2) 
programme directors (PDs), since they are also involved in drafting new organisational strategies. 
Because the IT department is small, consisting of ten people, the population consists of the entire IT 
department with the inclusion of five other departments as shown in Table 4. 
Table 3.2: The participants selected for this research 
Department Goal 
Shared services Consolidated business operations that are used by multiple parts of the same 
organisation. They are cost-efficient because they centralise back office operations 
that are used by multiple divisions of the same company and eliminate redundancy. 
Business 
development 
Proposes business deals, pitches products or administrations to new customers and 
keeps up a decent working association with new contacts. 
Finance Focuses on allocation of resources and the accounting, reporting and control of income 
and expenditure.  
Operations In charge of the procedure of making products and administrations. It includes 
arranging, sorting out, planning and controlling all assets expected to create an 
organisation’s merchandise and administrations. 
Corporate services Exists to render a far-reaching, incorporated human asset and organisational capacity 




The reasons for choosing this population are as follows: 
 The size of the IT department is small and likely to be of a manageable size for purposes of 
investigation, as recommended by Saunders et al. (2000). 
 Top managers and senior IT personnel are aware of the entire integrity of their organisation 
and have the power to integrate an IS continuity plan effectively in their organisation 
(Karkoszka, 2014). 
 An up-to-date list of all participants for the research was available, which included their 
contact telephone numbers and valid email addresses. 
 The population as a whole has an in-depth understanding of IS/IT and the business continuity 
spectrum. 
Table 3.3: Composition and roles of the sample populations 




CIO 12 1 Heads the IT portfolio and strategy. 
IT Manager 10 1 Ensures the business understands the IT 




11 1 Oversees IT projects and manages them 




9 1 Architect for IT solutions. 
ICT System 
Admin 
7 1 Responsible for ICT infrastructure and 
business support services. 
Business 
Analyst 
8 1 Responsible for gathering information from 
stakeholders, developing business and data 
models that describe their requirements and 
writing specifications to provide an accurate 
blueprint for the designing, building and 
testing of proposed business solutions. 
Business 
Process Analyst 
8 1 Has the knowledge and skills to analyse, 
improve, redesign and implement business 
processes.  
Developers 9 1 Develops the system and other related ICT 




5 and 6 2 Serves as a support service, including 
helpdesk, support desk and Oracle support. 






















12 1 In charge of project budgets and managing 
costing and expenses. 
 
The selected organisation was established in 1999 as a government economic programme whose 
focus it is to raise the level of direct foreign investment in a country’s economy and has started to 
employ new and more efficient management technological tools and processes, such as e-commerce 
and e-business. However, the growth in technology, especially a reliance on IT, has exposed them to 
threats. In this context, efforts to discover and improve the ways in which technological risk can be 
detected and mitigated became of paramount important 
 
3.5.2 Data-collection techniques 
According to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2000), data can be collected from primary and 
secondary sources. Primary data is first-hand information obtained from questionnaires, focus groups, 
interviews, and direct observation. Secondary data includes data from existing sources, such as 
archives, documentary data, annual reports, publications, newspapers and internet surveys (Saunders 
et al., 2009). Saunders et al. (2009) recommend using both primary and secondary sources in the same 
study, arguing that this combination can enhance the validation of data and increase accuracy. On 
these grounds, this study adopts the use of both primary and secondary sources. The secondary data 
emanates from the organisational annual report obtained from the organisational communication 
head. Primary data was obtained from semi-structured interviews conducted with different 
participants across the departments: shared services, business development, finance, operations and 
corporate services, and from the IT unit. 
Semi-structured interviews allow participants to talk about the phenomena without interruption. They 
allow a participant to raise issues or important points a researcher might not have considered. These 
points have the potential to lead to new insights and rich, detailed information, or the capturing of 
‘thick’ data. Bearing in mind the relatively small size of the sample, time was not a constraint, which 
is another reason for choosing an open-ended question interview format. In addition, open-ended 
questions are more suitable for exploratory research where the researcher is not aware of, or able to 
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predict, alternative answers (Hair et al., 2003). A review of literature dealing with risk mitigation 
strategies and information systems continuity provided the researcher with the idea of developing 
alternatives to the answers that support the use of open-ended questions. Thereafter, the researcher 
can emphasise specific questions to clarify issues raised. The information from the interviews has 
been analysed, contrasted and compared with that provided in literature. Knight (2002) claims that 
semi-structured interviews form the halfway base between structured and more subjective 
unstructured interviews. This study adopts semi-structured interviews in person because respondents 
were easily reached, being based in the same location as the researcher and also for the purpose of 
observing the body language of respondents. Moreover, semi-structured interviews allow respondents 
to express their opinions and possibly bring up subjects and areas for exploration of which the 
researcher might not have been aware. The researcher set out to build rapport with each respondent 
and interviews were informal and conversational. 
Meyer and Newman (2007) point out issues that might emerge during interviews, such as the biased 
nature of information from key informants, lack of trust, new entry to the organisation, time pressure 
on respondents and possible inconsistency of data collected due to the interviewer being 
inexperienced. To compensate for such issues, the following procedures are used: 
 Interview guidelines to ensure that questions lead to detailed, rather than yes/no, responses. 
 Proper planning, so that respondents may be willing to provide and offer thorough and 
detailed information. 
 Communicating openly, accurately and transparently to build trust. 
 
For confidentiality purposes, the organisation is not mentioned by name and is referred to as IDZ_X. 
The researcher signed a non-disclosure agreement that was approved by IDZ_X. Interviewees are 
identified by a code (Par) throughout the entire study in order to respect their anonymity. 
3.5.3 The development of the research instrument 
To understand what underlying technological risk factor and associated risk mitigation strategies 
were, a research instrument (Appendix A) was conducted to a portion of the sample population, as 
described in Table 3.3. Each of the questions in the research instrument was designed to provide 
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insight into the research question. The questions could also be mapped to Organization, Human and 
Technological factors.  
3.5.4 Pre-testing of research instrument 
Conducting pilots enable researchers to identify problems and refine the data collection strategies, 
and further assist in the development of instruments so that right questions are asked to yield relevant 
results from the respondents (Yin, 1994). The research instrument for this study was pre-tested during 
the pilot study involving seven participants to ensure that data would yield relevant results to achieve 
the research objectives.  The results were recorded and analyzed. At the end of the pilot, necessary 
changes were made to the instrument.  
3.6 Data Analysis 
Data analysis is an approach that involves a rigorous and logical process to establish meaning from 
data (Gray, 2009). Myers (2009) suggests various methods of data analysis that can be applied to 
qualitative studies, such as discourse analysis, grounded theory, thematic analysis, narrative analysis 
and phenomenology. Data in qualitative analysis, according to Dey (1993), is fragmented into small 
units to establish the characteristics of each unit, and through this process connection are made 
between concepts and new meaning is generated. A total of ten IT personnel interviews were 
conducted with the inclusion of five top managers from shared services, business development, 
finance, operations and corporate services units. 
 
3.6.1 Thematic analysis 
Transcription 
Interviews were recorded via audio recording and transcription followed. Transcribed recordings 
were stored in Microsoft Word to enable the data to be easily recalled, read and understood. After the 
data had been transcribed, the researcher began to familiarise himself with the content of the data 
through the process of reading and reading the data.  
 
Generating initial code 
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According to Braun and Clarke (2006), this process is a cyclical process whereby codes emerge 
throughout the research process. The researcher went back and forth between data sets to identify 
codes that in most cases repeatedly expressed the same incident, which were then grouped as a theme. 
For example, when phrases like, “there is a risk mitigation strategy in the organisation, but I am not 
aware of it” and “I have not seen it. For me as a manager, I see it as a risk and I can’t remember if 
there was anything circulated” were analysed, it was noted that these statements were defining the 
same thing – a lack of involvement, information not being shared and lack of communication. These 
themes were grouped as a lack of information circulation. These themes are derived from a risk 
mitigation strategy pattern in the context of IDZ conversational topics from the interviews conducted. 
For example, the identified theme of lack of information circulation enabled the researcher to describe 
that IT unit staff lack the commitment to share the importance of a continuity plan. This also relates 
to the lack of knowledge of a continuity plan and lack of involving personnel from other departments 
in adopting a risk mitigation plan. 
 
Searching for themes 
According to Braun et al. (2006), this phase is significant for a researcher to begin examining how 
codes combine to form a theme in the data. At this stage, the researcher looked at the list of themes 
and began to focus on the pattern in the data. For example, themes like backup plan, security policy, 
revised policy, security procedures and risk awareness were on the list. The researcher considered the 
relationships between these themes. Themes consist of ideas within a culture that can be used to 
explain causal event (Braun et al., 2006). The researcher then narrowed down these themes to provide 
an overreaching theme. Thematic analysis allows for themes to emerge from repeating ideas, 
metaphors, similarities and differences of participants’ linguistic expressions (Braun et al., 2006). 
The researcher examined repeated ideas and similarities from themes. For example, codes such as 
Backup plan, security policy, revise policy, security procedures and risk awareness, were examined 





In this stage the researcher reworked potential themes and some were merged into each other. For 
example, themes like communicate the plan and share information were combined to become 
‘communication’. Some of the themes like mobile solution were reworked as ‘mobility as a solution’. 
The researcher re-read the data set to check whether themes related to that data set. Themes were 
found to be coherent and related to the data set. The researcher repeated the process with each theme 
to check if they mapped back to the data set and all themes were found to be coherent.  Table 3.4 
depicts the emerging themes. 
Table 3.4: Emerging key themes 
Theme Subthemes 
Human 
 Disaster experience 
 Awareness  
Organisational 
 Information difficulty and communication 
 Documentation 
 Mitigation strategy solution 
 Mobility solution 
 Revise security policies 
 On-going continuous security check 
 Mitigation strategy challenges 
 Top management support 
 Lack of expertise 




4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Introduction  
The preceding chapter discussed the methodology used to execute the study. The purpose of this 
chapter is to present the findings. The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: the demographic 
findings are discussed, followed by the emergent themes from the analysis. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the findings. 
 
4.2 Demographics  
The study was conducted at one organisation and fifteen respondents participated from the 
organisation. The findings are tabulated in Table 4.1. According to the findings, ten participants are 
from the IT department, two from corporate services, one from business development, one from 
shared services, and one from finance. Corporate Services & Operations is a department that deals 
with activities that combine or consolidate enterprise support services, and provides specialised 
knowledge, best practises and technology to serve internal and external clients and business partners. 
The business development department proposes new deals. Shared services is a department that 
consolidates business operations that are used by multiple parts of the same organisation. 
Respondents who are not from the IT department are mostly in executive positions. These include 
the executive manager of Corporate Services & Operations, programme director of Business 
Development, and an account manager who is acting chief financial officer (CFO). The participants 
were chosen based on their depth of understanding of mitigation strategies, as well as their working 
experience at the organisation. 
According to Table 4.1, one respondent has a working experience of between 0 and 5 years, seven 
have between 6 and 9, and seven have between 10 and 12 years of experience. The majority (8) of 
the respondents are between the ages of 46 and 55. Six (6) are between the ages of 36 and 45, and 





Table 4.1: Respondents profile 
Respondent Alias Title Department Age Experience Education 
Respondent 1 Executive manager  Corporate 
services & 
Operations 
55 12 MBA, LLM 





50 10 MBA, MCOM 
Respondent 3 Executive manager Business 
development 
47 12 MBA, MSC 
Respondent 4 Programme 
director/ Executive 
manager 
Shared services 49 10 MBA, MSC 
Respondent 5 CFO/Finance 
Execute Manager 
Finance  55 12 MCOM, MBA, CA 
Respondent 6 CIO ICT 54 12 MPhil, MCOM, 
MSC 
Respondent 7 Solution Architect  46 9 MCOM, COBIT 
Respondent 8 System Admin 37 7 BSC, N+, A+, 
CCNA 
Respondent 9 Project Manager 47 9 BCOM 
Respondent 10 IT Manager 37 10 Project management 
certificate 
Respondent 11 Developer  40 9 IT diploma, IT 
certificate 
Respondent 12 Business Analyst 37 8 BCOM, CPAB 
Respondent 13 Business Process 
Analyst 
38 8 BCOM 
Respondent 14 Oracle support  26 5 CCNA, A+, N+, IT 
certificate  
Respondent 15 Security specialist 40 6 BCOM, Diploma 
     
 
The findings on the respondents’ qualifications show that three possess a certificate or certification, 
five possess a degree or diploma, and seven possess a master’s degree or a Master of Business 
Administration (MBA). It is significant to note that education level is important to the study as it 
affects the attitudes of individuals and the way they understand a particular concept, their in-depth 
knowledge of a particular phenomenon under study and their provision of further relevant knowledge 
during the interview. 
4.3 Technological Disaster 
The findings show that the majority of respondents had not experienced a technological disaster at 
their work place. Most were aware of regular tests, although were not sure about the server and system 
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tests due to lack of experience. Respondent 15 from the IT department admitted to being unaware of 
regular testing of systems by the server: 
“I can’t answer that … I think they do test on a regular basis, but I don’t know time intervals … No 
I don’t know … I don’t know really, but I think Oracle, it’s monthly or quarterly, but am not sure. 
But there are policies and [a] service level agreement (SLA) with an ideal but again am not sure.” 
Having an employee from the IT department being unaware of the kind of technical integrity systems 
are subject to is worrying and shows the culture of disaster readiness and awareness possessed by the 
organisation. According to some respondents, this lack of awareness was perpetuated by IT 
management because the lower the level of experience of an individual, the less management 
perceived them to be adding to the organisation’s IT system. Respondent 14 confirms:  
“I have no knowledge of that, and thus experience is one of the factors that IT management seems to 
side line us. I believe that in order to create a culture of preparedness, everyone in the organisation 
must kept on the loop about system/server testing.” 
This is consistent with findings by Lewis et al., (2017) that the necessary support, for example 
regarding to system and server testing, is not always provided by the business and some employees 
remain uninformed. According to a respondent from the IT unit, organisations perceive the role of 
server and system testing as being suited to only certain individuals with technical skills, as 
Respondent 12 explains: 
“… The organisational perception is that the role of server and system testing is the responsibility of 
specific IT individuals, because they perceive everyone as not technically inclined.” 
Respondent 9 made similar remarks: 
“… As a result of this we can ignore warning signs and alarms because we are not involved in testing 
and therefore we don’t know if anything goes wrong or not. I personally would like to be involved 
and be groomed in order to be technically aware.” 
These consistent remarks are alarming because, according to Hausmann et al., (2015), even though 
server/system testing is the responsibility of the IT unit, everybody in the organisation should be 
made aware of testing and procedure. Hausmann et al., (2015) cautions to examine the role of self-
perception in technological disaster as the perception a department may have in terms of its 
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contribution to testing, i.e. other departments may perceive themselves not to be technically inclined; 
therefore they do not participate in system/server testing. 
Few were aware of the testing procedures. For example, Respondent 6 indicates that in his capacity 
and his knowledge as a CIO the system and server test involves IT resources, the service provider 
and business users. 
“… Testing is conducted from the Disaster Recovery server room at our head offices. It involves IT 
resources, such as testing staff and specialist, ten desktop PCs from which testing is conducted and 
those PCs are built to accommodate all user profiles within the organisation, and of course our 
service provider. Bear in mind that testing is conducted bi-annually and all data from the testing 
result are stored on tapes as a backup regiment.” 
Respondent 8 shared a similar remark to Respondent 6 by expressing his knowledge as testing staff: 
“… As part of the testing team, we conduct all tests at our dedicated sever room at the head office. 
The testing runs for a full week, twice a year from Friday afternoon at 17:00 till the next Friday 
morning at 05:00. Backup of all data is done on tapes after the test and they are kept in the server 
room.” 
The detect principle was seen as a significant strategy to be used as a monitoring and alert tool in 
order to detect capacity deficiencies, such as running out of memory or storage, as Respondent 6 
indicates: 
“We have a monitoring and alert strategy to detect all our system, server and backup storage. For 
example, every month we do a system/server check-up to minimise the impact of disruption due to 
limited storage. By so doing we are able to detect the capacity our server/systems have to store a 
backup of all our data.” 
 
4.4 Human Factor 
Two factors were identified as important for addressing disaster and mitigation planning in the 




4.4.1 Disaster experience 
The findings show that the majority of the respondents had not experienced a significant disaster in 
their working environment. However, most were very vocal about the recent shut down of the server 
in the organisation. For example Respondent 1 indicated that recently: 
“I did experience a disaster, and it did affect my job where I had lost everything on my laptop 
including my work. I have also experienced a cyber-crime in the past and all the company 
information that was on my PC was lost. I was frustrated because I was fearful of investors and 
clients that they might find out that information were lost because the information that was lost 
contained a year-end financials, product pricing and financial monthly report.” 
Respondent 5 reiterates: 
“I personally cannot state I have experienced a disaster at work but the Monday disaster was a 
problem … the server had to shut down and systems went down for the whole week and we couldn’t 
work. Our suppliers were frustrated with the situation because they were not able to do invoicing, 
and on their side as well it causes a delay.” 
There was a consistent understanding that a disaster was not a common incident at the organisation 
and therefore most had not experienced it. This is perceived as a problem because, according to 
Respondent 12, this could lead to employees not being ready when a disaster happens and “most like 
me have a low level of fear for a disaster”. The findings were consistent with Jones et al. (2015) who 
notes that it is not until a disaster or a terrible loss occurs that people realise the need for disaster 
preparedness. The absence of the experience of a disaster results in a low level of fear of a disaster 
and adversely impacts the practices of effective continuity efforts. Consistent remarks of self-
awareness reflected a relationship between experiencing a disaster and developing an understanding 
of vulnerabilities. As Respondent 3 shares: 
“Establishing a relationship between experience of a disaster and attitude will provide staff with 
a disposal towards a disaster and self-awareness. This implies that should there be a disaster, we 
will know what to do. We will be fully prepared and this will create a culture of preparedness.” 
 
The proposed recommendations were not currently practised at the organisation and none of the 
respondents could categorically describe how they would address a disaster and what mitigation plans 
42 
 
they have in place. The lack of employee’s preparedness, familiarity and exposure is what Jones 
(2015) and Lewis et al. (2017) attribute to the causation of a disaster. 
 
4.4.2 Disaster awareness 
The need for regular awareness was perceived to be important for an environment characterised as 
not being fearful of a disaster. According to most respondents, regular risk awareness raised possible 
disaster awareness, which can then lead to a continuous risk mitigation strategy. According to 
Respondent 13, this needs to be explicitly communicated, because: 
“Some of us still have that comfort that it’s [a disaster’s] not going to happen to us. Based on our 
experience, we think we safe until something happens. Therefore risk awareness is significant to 
create preparedness.” 
Respondent 3 supports the need for regular organisational awareness at all levels and suggests “every 
two weeks or a month there should be awareness programs and put them [the programs] on the 
intranet, to increase level of preparedness”. In this way, according to Respondent 15, the organisation 
will be “raising awareness of the risk of a potential occurrence and the way it should be managed, 
and in so doing improves the organisation’s preparedness to disasters”. These findings show that 
employees are willing to learn, become aware of disaster situations and be prepared when an incident 
occurs. According to Ozkazanc & Yuksela, 2015, employees are eager to learn more about policies 
on disaster awareness and preparedness and are seeking to increase their knowledge in this domain 
and enhance their skills on preparedness. These programs can act as a catalyst to improve (i) employee 
morale because low morale can reduce effectiveness, safety, or system performance (Hollnagel, 
2014); (ii) and simultaneously change behaviour as a result of experience (Hollnagel, 2014). 
Respondent 1, from corporate services, postulates that strong awareness can be achieved by training 
all employees on strategy mitigation and suggests that “training programs target at improving 
awareness and motivate us employees by providing us an opportunity to work in groups through 
scenarios in order to face future challenges”. There was a common understanding from other 
respondents that awareness should not only be about disaster preparedness in the organisation, but, 
according to Respondent 4, it should be an on-going “education and training program that intends to 
cultivate awareness of mitigation procedures to all employees in the organisation”. Although most 
respondents admitted not being aware of training programs in the organisation, they regarded such 
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programs as enablers for employees to be disaster conscious and to be risk aware and prepared. 
Training programs help to reduce resistance by providing all employees with an opportunity to think 
critically of future challenges. These findings are consistent with Kumar et al. (2017) who believe 
that if considerable effort and expenditure on education, training programs and level of preparedness 
remains high, it will encourage awareness in an organisation because these programs provide all 
employees with an opportunity to think in-depth about future disasters. 
 
4.5 Organisational Factors 
4.5.1 Mitigation strategy solutions 
Three mitigation strategies were proposed: the need for mobility, the revision of security policies and 
on-going continuous security checks. 
a) Mobility as a solution 
Several respondents highlighted the need to be mobile as a means of addressing a disaster scenario 
and as one potential mitigation plan. Respondent 1 explains:  
“Technology nowadays progresses so fast we become more mobile, and we require a mobile solution, 
so if the power fails, or we denied access from the building, as we have experienced that incident, at 
least we have laptops, iPads and smartphones built with organisational app, so we have this mobility 
as a solution.” 
 
Such a solution that allowed mobility was seen as important for the continuity of work, as Respondent 
3 clarifies: 
“Relating from my previous experience, we used mobility as a solution in ensuring that in a case of 
a disaster there is a solution in place which will allow us to continue our work in an absence of an 
office space. People will manage their own time, while technological developments are enabling new 
forms of productivity independent of office-based work.” 
The solution was also vocalised by the systems specialist, as he perceived mobility as an adaptable 
method for conducting and planning work away from the physical building. Respondent 8 explains: 
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“The mobile solution will provide us with the flexibility to plan, conduct work and share important 
files while we [are] away from the physical building. This increase flexibility and agility. Technology 
is creating an opportunity for a new form of collaboration, changing not only where we work from, 
but how we work.” 
This was reiterated by Respondent 9: 
“Accessing your work while you at home or any space office, serves us as a solution since picketing 
is something we experiencing every now and then. The mobile solution platform offers the advanced 
knowledge sharing capabilities that transcend business activities. This is a flexible method to be 
reflected in the physical infrastructure of work, where it is no longer necessary for a dynamic teams 
to be co-located.” 
Continuous research on new mobility solutions was also pointed out as significant for organisations 
as, despite the fact that a solution might currently exist, it is critical to continue researching new 
advancements so the organisation can remain ahead of technological changes and abreast of 
innovations. As Respondent 11 states: 
“Once we adopt mobility as a solution, we need to continue with the research on new mobility so as 
to keep up to date to merge with the new technology changes and threats. New technology platforms 
support a broader challenge to traditional organisational structure and enable a network-oriented 
approach.” 
 
Consistent with Respondent 11, another respondent from IT (Respondent 2) recalls his experience 
that: 
“We operate in an unstable technological environment, in this way to proceed with investigating new 
application that are good with the versatility will give us the capacity to remain ahead to threats.” 
Respondent 15, using his knowledge as a specialist and as a disaster recovery member, explains that 
there are recovery activities that are performed in a controlled manner to bring the business processes 
and systems back to a point of operation after a disaster: 
“We have recovery activities, such as a temporal housing of data, reconstruction and repair of any 
damaged to our infrastructure, review [of] a document of lessons learned and operational life support 
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system. This continues until all systems return to normal. We measure both long and short term 
strategy.” 
Consistent with Respondent 15, another respondent from IT (Respondent 6) recalls that: 
“Our risk mitigation strategy is a tested plan and is designed in such a way that it caters [to] a wide 
range of disaster activities. For example, if any crisis occurs our recovery team consults the 
documented recovery plan, which consists of lessons learn, mitigated disasters and risks encountered 
from past experience.” 
Respondents were able to recognise the significance of mobility as a solution, as it will allow them 
to plan and conduct work away from the physical environment. They also recognise the need to 
continue with research on new technologies once the mobility has been implemented. As a result, the 
growing pressures of working life cause more people to manage their own time, while technological 
developments enable new forms of productivity independent of office-based work. Similar reasoning 
is provided by Lewis et al. (2017) that essential tools, such as mobile devices and applications for 
conducting work away from the workplace, are important as they make it easy to respond to work 
functions and allow employees to plan and perform their day-to-day business activities away from 
the physical workplace, as well as in the case of infrastructure failure (Dangare et al., 2015). The 
findings of this study recall those of Vernim and Reinhart (2016), as they emphasise the importance 
of organisations providing the necessary flexible services to clients and being able to continue 
working in any given space. 
 
b) Revision of security policy 
There was a concern from most respondents that the security policies of the organisation were not 
regularly updated and could consequently not be relevant for the current technological environment. 
As Respondent 3 indicates: 
“Yes I am aware of the security policy. For example, once or twice a year ICT needs to remind us, 
as they never did because a technological disaster five years ago will not be the same as this year; 
we are moving in terms of technology.” 
Respondent 6 recalls his experience: 
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 “… According to my personal experience from my past employment is that security policies should 
be revised each year, in order to align the organisation with any form of protection it may require. 
Remember, as technology advances it creates more opportunity for new threats. Therefore, keeping 
continuous security policies is vital to stay ahead from threats.” 
Similar remarks are made by Respondent 8: 
“From all companies I worked for, I realised that revising security policy is the key, because it 
provides a blueprint that can be followed by everyone. And therefore will allow organisation to 
minimise risk and continuously stay ahead of new threats.” 
Another experienced respondent from shared services recalls his experience by indicating that even 
though security policy is the responsibility of the IT unit it should be organisation oriented. 
Respondent 4 explains: 
“Judging from my experience, security policy is the IT unit’s responsibility. However, I think security 
policy should be placed at the centre of a company’s objectives and encourage more strategic 
thoughts amongst its practitioners.” 
These findings highlight the importance of examining the practice of security policies in relation to 
the organisation as a whole so as to help organisations to minimise risks and allow them to respond 
quickly to a disaster (Hollnagel, 2014). There was a concern from a systems specialist respondent 
from the IT unit that the organisation should also focus on the development of re-insurance security 
policies and the collaboration between various IDZ organisations as part of their practice of revised 
security policies. As Respondent 13 states: 
“From my knowledge, there is a risk and security policy that aims to reduce risk by transferring it to 
other organisations, known as re-insurance companies. This procedure is documented as part of 
mitigation strategy good practice including activities, such as collaborating with other IDZ 
companies in order to share financial burden.” 
Respondents from this theme were able to reflect on their working experience. They vocalised that 
security policies need to be regularly revised in order to meet new technological challenges. They 
also recognise the need to utilise the company intranet as a form of security awareness, i.e. once or 
twice a year the organisation needs to remind employees about security policies because they operate 
in a changing technological environment. Jones (2015) suggests training and campaigns as the best 
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means of creating awareness and increasing understanding about security policies. This must be 
organisation oriented and placed at the centre of company objectives. 
 
c) On-going continuous security checks 
Most respondents identified the need to have continuous security checks. For example, Respondent 
2 notes: “regular system performance checks are important to eliminate any unforeseen situation.” 
Another respondent indicates: “a tested plan should be actioned regularly” (Respondent 3). 
Furthermore, “Once a month or quarterly we need to have a drill or simulation where there would be 
a false alarm about the disaster. In that way we will be able to improve our disaster experience, once 
it happens we will be able to identify if it’s a minimum or major disaster and we will know what to 
do.” (Respondent 10). According to Ahlan et al. (2015), conducting drills and simulations is the most 
effective way to evaluate and test disaster preparedness and instil a sense of confidence. 
Another experienced respondent from IT recalls his knowledge of the organisational planning for 
vacating the building when disaster occurs by indicating the alternative building with full of 
organisational equipment. Respondent 9 explains: 
“We are planning on having the alternative work station about 20 km away from our head offices. It 
is going to be built with full working station equipment, such as PCs, printers, telephones, office 
tables and chairs. This plan will allow us to continue with business as usual at our alternative 
workstation. While on the other hand we are fixing any damages caused during the crises.” 
The proposed recommendations were not currently practised at the organisation and none of the 
respondents could categorically describe how to address a disaster and what mitigation plans they 
currently have in place. 
 
4.5.2 Documentation  
All respondents reported a lack of documentation of important information and events. For example, 
Respondent 6 saw the lack of documentation as a continuous problem during disaster occurrence: 
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“Lack of documenting the type of disasters that we have experienced and their solutions seems a 
continuous issue. It is very significant to document what caused a previous disaster, how they were 
mitigated and what fixes were implemented.” 
Respondent 9 restates: 
“We do not learn from our previous mistakes, consistently we encounter a disaster, for example, 
cyber-crime and infrastructure related issues; however, no documentation is set up. It implies that 
issues that we have encountered have been overlooked.” 
Although most respondents report the lack of documentation as a challenge, those from the IT 
department were more vocal. For example, Respondent 9 noted that employees perceived 
documentation as a trivial task and therefore it was not given importance. As Respondent 9 explains: 
“People verbally legitimise why the documentation is basic, yet nothing concrete is done. For 
example people keep on talking about documentation but there always seem to be an excuse on 
why it is not happening. This seems to be an aspect of an organisation and not only a problem in 
disaster mitigation … it seems like people they talk without acting on their words. This is a big 
organisation to have such kind of employees who do not think beyond safety.” 
 
Respondent 10 agrees that the lack of documentation is a problem for the organisation and, after 
reflecting on past experience, noted that this is the only organisation they have worked for that lacks 
disaster and mitigation documentation. They explain: 
“According to my vast experience, 35 years on the job, I understand that registry as part of 
documentation should exist which lists all the disaster experienced and their solutions. It should 
be easily accessible to everyone in the organisation and must kept updated on a regular basis, 
because we [are] operating in a technological environment.” 
Respondent 2 shares similar remarks: 
“All problems should be listed and if the problems and solutions are in the central place, it is easy 




The implication is that the organisation should hold employees accountable for the documentation of 
their respective functionalities, and ensure organisational access to this documentation. Kumar, 
Zaveri and Choski (2017) note that this is crucial in any organisation because providing information 
on a disaster and how it can be mitigated will encourage awareness and preparedness. It will also help 
with retaining institutional memory because in any organisation people will come and go, business 
processes will change, technology will improve and change, equipment will be replaced, and all these 
changes will cause risk to transform and migrate (Järveläinen, 2013). 
With regards to accountability, Respondent 8 called for dedicated personnel who would handle the 
documentation of disaster and mitigation concerns in the organisation: 
“Nobody is looking at problems experienced, and nobody seems to take the accountability to 
document the issues and rectifications, i.e. we need an accountable person whose responsibilities 
are to look after all disasters experienced and make sure that they are addressed and 
documented.” 
The findings show consistent remarks from all respondents that there is a lack of documentation of 
important information, such as experienced disasters and fixes. It is very important to document such 
information because employees come and go and, therefore, if experienced employees leave the 
organisation without any documentation in place, this will cause a time delay on critical business 
processes and fixes because the new employees may not have the capacity to solve issues on time. 
On the other hand, some experienced employees vocalised that this document must be saved and 
stored on a central repository for quick reference and accessibility by all employees and must be kept 
up to date at all times. These findings echo Kulba et al. (2017), who suggest that an IT unit should 
have written procedures for how issues are resolved and what issues are encountered and regular IT 
system maintenance procedures. In so doing, the IT unit sets a precedent for being accountable and 
addressing the documentation challenge. 
 
4.5.3 Information difficulties and communication 
This theme refers to the distribution or exchange of information across the entire organisation. The 
findings show that the information being communicated is not comprehensive enough and not all 
employees are provided with this information. For example, Respondent 10 indicates that most 
employees have ben not given information on how to handle a disaster occurrence: 
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“Even though some and very few are aware on what to do, I don’t think that all of us are aware 
of what we need to do in the case of a disaster, and most of us will not know what to do or which 
step to take.” 
Respondent 5, who is a CFO and an organisational risk committee member, agrees: 
“Sometimes information is communicated between certain individuals and it’s a continuous 
problem because some of them do not understand the importance of mitigation plan. This 
translates the lack of awareness for specific individuals.” 
The findings show that lack of communication and knowledge sharing was a common problem in the 
organisation. These findings are similar to those of Ahmad et al. (2012) who note that sometimes 
necessary information about a security procedure is circulated to irrelevant people, small numbers of 
individuals or discrete groups who do not utilise the information simply because they do not 
understand the content or fail to see its importance. Further, these findings on the lack of 
communication and information sharing have been established as a common organisational challenge, 
as noted by Hausmann et al. (2015). For example, according to Järveläinen (2013), in many public 
organisations the mitigation plan is present but not circulated across departments and individuals and 
some relevant personnel are not included during the development of the risk mitigation plan. In this 
study, this problem was mainly vocalised by respondents who were not from the IT department, such 
as Respondent 5: 
“Knowledge is not shared in this organisation. You will only find out about something when it is 
no longer important or in use. This is really frustrating and affects my work performance.” 
Respondent 3 agrees and indicates that in their capacity as a manager, having information 
communicated to them at all times is crucial for planning and continuity: 
“I think as a manager, I should know so that within that IS continuity plan I should become a risk 
owner of some part of element on it, to understand so that the environment that I am managing, 
including the assets that are in my disposal, I am able to respond within the provision of that 
continuity plan.” 
The above feelings expressed by Respondent 3 were consistent amongst all managers as they saw a 
mitigation plan as important to the organisation and requiring all stakeholders to be involved in its 
planning. As Respondent 12 indicates:  
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“Being involved in the process of the mitigation plan is important and then communicate the 
mitigation plan; if the plan is for the organisation, then it should be communicated throughout the 
organisation. Mitigation strategy is organisational and therefore everyone should be included on 
the communication”. 
Similar remarks were made by Respondent 1: 
“Mitigation plan requires effective communication across departments in order to ensure that 
requirements of mitigation strategy are translated to real actions and remains relevant with 
changing business environment and business activities.” 
Continuous assessment of the mitigation plan was also highlighted as important for the continuity of 
the organisation, as Respondent 15 states: 
“A mitigation plan should then be tested to see if it would be able to work. Furthermore, risk 
committee will be able to foresee disasters that might occur, then after the risk committee see if 
the mitigation plan is executable, then they should communicate and circulate it to the rest of the 
organisation.” 
 
Revaluation of the mitigation plan is an important aspect of safeguarding the organisation because, 
according to Kulba et al. (2017), the plan should be tested and translated to real world actions to 
ensure that it speaks to a relevant business environment and is communicated throughout the entire 
organisation. In this way, when danger occurs everyone will knows what to do. Respondent 6 
indicates in their capacity and knowledge as a CIO there is a predefined procedure in the organisation 
to communicate alerts to relevant parties for them to fix a threat: 
“When there is an incidence in our company, our recovery team communicates the crises by 
alerting appropriate personnel within each unit in order for them to fix any crises or threats. These 
personnel are part of recovery committee and they have a know-how of a situation. By so doing 
we are able to minimise incidence in a controlled manner.” 
Respondents indicate that minimal information being distributed and information being kept between 
specific individuals is a challenge to employees, specifically those who are not in the ICT. They felt 
that information should be shared across the entire organisation because each employee becomes a 
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risk owner of some element. Therefore, in any occurrence they are able to respond within the 
provision of continuity plan. Mitigation strategy requires effective communication, therefore it needs 
to be tested and circulated to the rest of the organisation. 
4.5.4  Mitigation strategy challenges 
The findings show that there are two challenges faced namely top management support and lack of 
lack of expertise as discussed below. 
a) Top management support 
A successful project requires the backing of management who provides financial and other related 
resources for its execution. The findings of this study show that there was minimal support from top 
management. One consistent grievance from respondents was the lack of financial resources from top 
management to address the disaster and mitigation strategy. The respondents perceived financial 
resources as a key asset because it is associated with the need for up-to-date IT infrastructure, as 
Respondent 14 illustrates: 
“Money is a factor because we need the financial resources to keep us up with the new 
technologies to protect organisational information assets. This can never be successful without 
the top management support. Without finance we will never keep up an innovative approach to 
mitigation strategy”. 
Respondent 11 from the IT department reiterates this: 
“We need to go to internet base, not a server base environment. Moreover, we need more human 
resources and physical resources, which entail us to seek more financial backup. Remember, as 
technology progresses, new technological challenges also progresses, therefore server base 
environment has more challenges than internet base environment.” 
Respondent 10 associates top management’s lack of commitment to the provision of financial 
resources with their management style, which did not favour on-going communication and 
collaboration with employees. As a consequence, management and employees do not share the same 
vision and urgency for addressing disaster management. The findings echo those in literature that 
most organisations allocate relatively small portions of their budgets to mitigation strategy plans 
(Ahlan et al., 2015) because of the lack of top management support for a mitigation strategy and their 
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deliberate ignorance of the importance of IT systems and very real threats to those systems (Ahlan et 
al., 2015). According to Respondent 10:  
“The most important step that our managers can pursue is for them to channel their effort in to 
understanding the need of each department, in this requires them listening to us … a consistent 
collaboration between us employees and the management is important, so that we can all offer a 
comprehensive knowledge on mitigation strategy. We all have something to contribute to 
mitigation strategies because we are custodians of risk”. 
The continuous lack of collaboration and support from top management was seen as problematic to 
the realisation of mitigation implementation strategies, as Respondent 4 warns: 
“If employees and top management are cross divided, there will not be a shared vision for 
mitigation strategy and risk management; and the consequence will be catastrophic as you know 
… I mean we could be prone to all sorts of cybercrime and stuff like that … that is not something 
we want to experience in our organisation.” 
This comment was consistent across the data corpus, as Respondent 5 shows: 
“Senior manager support is very important to determine the success of the risk mitigation project 
and therefore I feel it is significant for them to give us the support by allocating enough time for 
trainings, finance the project and availability of human skill”. 
 
b) Lack of expertise 
There is a concern from the executive managers that the organisation lacks IT expertise, specifically 
when it comes to disaster recovery and mitigation strategy implementation. Although the respondents 
see existing IT skills as important, they believe they are insufficient to address the turbulent 
technological environment within which the organisation finds itself. For example, Respondent 7 
shows how difficult it is to obtain employees who have know-how in the organisation: 
“… Most people do not understand what to do in the case of a technological disaster … this is a 
problem because we need people at all times who understand the organisation and its risks, 
process and technology. In this way we can say we are prepared for disaster should it occur.” 
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Business development executive manager that managers who are responsible with organisational 
resources such as human skill and finance that contributes towards mitigation strategy that they are 
not informing the recovery team for preparedness, as Respondent 4 states: 
“When I called the employees they were astonished that they were required for [a] mitigation 
strategy session as no one from top managers had informed them. Some participants came with 
no document prepared of any kind and some had no clue about what they ought to be doing.” 
Moreover, creating teams and assigning roles and responsibilities was seen as appropriate, as 
Respondent 10 states: 
“… Top management should assign a person with the appropriate seniority and authority to be 
responsible for risk mitigation strategy. This person will assign individuals within each 
department based on their experience and the knowledge of organisational disaster to develop 
and maintain risk mitigation strategy.” 
Similar remarks were made by Respondent 7: 
“… Selected people from various business areas who understand the organisation and its risks, 
process and technology are required to create mitigation strategy. Mitigation strategy should be 
cross functional and include personnel from each department.” 
This consent was also vocalised by Respondent 2, who is at the executive level: 
“… Recovery teams from all departments need to be involved in providing knowledge and the 
understanding to guide mitigation strategy and develop the continuous improvement to keep it 
current.” 
Having a recovery team constituted of members from each department is perceived as important. As 
documented by Hyväri (2016), this means having recovery coordinators within each business area 
who are responsible for creating and documenting risks and rectifications for their own departments 
and who drive risk mitigation strategy at departmental level. Järveläinen (2013) postulates that the 
selected recovery teams should not only be from the IT unit, but should involve people from other 
departments in order to ensure wide participation since overall process is risk mitigation strategy and 
recovery solution for business functions. Ahlan et al. (2015) argues that having small teams from 
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various departments with clear responsibilities , which understand their area of expertise and proper 
structure, is better than having a single large recovery team that holds the entire obligation. 
 
4.6 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide the qualitative findings from the study. The results show 
that most respondents at the organisation have not experienced a technological disaster and as a 
consequence few are aware of what to do in the occurrence of one. Most respondents felt the lack of 
awareness was due to a lack of collaboration and information sharing within the organisation, 
specifically amongst various departments. The IT department was perceived to have the know-how 
to address technological disaster but there was minimal involvement of employees from other 
departments in the development of a mitigation strategy and even in the distribution of information 
of what to do during a disaster. Collaboration and information sharing was seen as key to addressing 
the lack of awareness of the mitigation strategies the organisation has in place. 
Respondents also noted that although mitigation strategies might be in place there is a need to include 
mobile solution related strategies that would allow continuous operation of the organisation and a 
revisit of the security policies to see if they address the current technological landscape. A continuous 
observation by the respondents was the lack of top management support for the implementation of 
these strategies because such solutions need financial support and expertise to implement them. As 
such, solutions were proposed and minimal management support provided. The lack of such support 
also negatively affects the distribution of important information to members of the organisation, 
making the information reach few of those requiring the information. 
Table 4.2: Summery of the results 
Some of the results Comments  
Documentation  There is no central registry to store documents of how 
problems were solved 
Lack of documentation on how problem were solved 
Don’t learn from past mistakes 
All problems should be listed and documented  
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There should be a lesson learned document  
Awareness  No awareness on system testing  
Risk awareness is significant to create preparedness  
Strong awareness can be achieved by training all employees 
on strategy mitigation 
training programs target at improving awareness and motivate 
employees by providing then with an opportunity to work in 
groups through scenarios in order to face future challenges 
It should be an on-going education and training program 
Responsibility  For server testing everyone perceive it as a role of IT 
Monitor and alert strategy There is a server and backup storage to detect the capacity of 
a server/system that have to store a backup of all data 
Mobility solution There must be a mobility as a solution so that worker can still 
continue working 
It allows to work in an absence of working environment  
Plan and share work in a flexible time 
Security policy   Security policy must be revised once or twice a year 
Alternative work station having the alternative work station about 20 km away from 
our head offices 
Information circulation Information must be circulated to everyone  
Shared knowledge Knowledge must be shared throughout the organisation  
Involvement  Involve everyone in the mitigation plan, then communicate it 
across department 






5.1 Background and Summary of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to examine risk factors and associated mitigation strategies in public 
institutions of South Africa. An Industrial Development Zone (IDZ) was used as a case study within 
the South African context. The study had two objectives of (i) identifying risks associated with public 
institutions; and (ii) examining how public institutions address risk mitigation strategies. Following 
a qualitative enquiry approach, the study identified human, organisational and technological risk 
factors as those that impact mitigation strategies in public institutions of South Africa. Human factors 
perceived as significant to how mitigation strategies are implemented were the levels of experience, 
exposure and awareness that organisational members have with regards to disasters. The lack of 
documentation of important information, such as experienced disasters and fixes, lack of 
communication and knowledge sharing, lack of top management and lack of available expertise were 
recorded as organisational risk factors that consequently impacted mitigation strategies.  
Proposed contextual solutions for these challenges included: (i) the adoption of mobile solutions and 
on-going research of new mobility solutions so as to keep up to date with technological 
advancements; (ii) the regular update of security policies of the organisation so as to align with 
environmental challenges; and (iii) on-going continuous security checks to evaluate and test disaster 
preparedness. Awareness of tools and applications used to address mitigation was seen as a key 
technological factor. Findings show that most organisational members, including those in the IT unit, 
were unaware of the security systems in place. 
 
5.2 Contribution of the Study 
Whilst most IT systems are faced with technological challenges, few studies have examined this 
problem in the context of an Industrial Development Zone (IDZ). This study contributes to a better 
explanation of the challenges faced by IDZs in the developing country of South Africa and, in so 
doing, puts forward the following practical recommendations: 




 Encourage information and knowledge sharing by including key members of each department 
in mitigation plans. 
 Ensure top management’s involvement in mitigation planning and their need to provide 
financial support and expertise. 
 Adopt mobile viable solutions as potential mitigation strategies. 
 Establish on-going security checks and revise existing security policies. 
 
5.3 Limitation and Future work 
The conceptual model in Figure 2.3 clearly demonstrates how failing to engage in a risk management 
process can adversely impact on critical business process. Given that organisations are affected by 
contextual factors, with each phase of the risk management process, the organisation should be 
cognisant of the need to readdress risk factors which could have changed due to the volatile 
environment. Although this research has contributed to the understanding of mitigation strategies, it 
has prompted the need for future research. Future research should focus on following issues: 
 The research focused on a number of aspects of technological risk factor and mitigation 
strategies such as; risk in information systems, internal factors, mitigation strategies, the 
effective of mitigation strategies, disaster factors and  the effectiveness of the mitigation 
strategies approach in the IDZ i.e. public organisation. Although this research helped to 
explore these factors and to achieve the objectives of the research, it did not provide the 
opportunity to explore in more depth some of the areas related to risk mitigation in other 
public sector organisations. This is one of the limitation of the study. Further research can 
focus on the practice of risk mitigation strategies within other type of public organisations, 
such as Local Municipal, Regional Municipal and Government sectors 
 The study has not set a thorough focus on technological factors to assess a high availability 
of systems and server testing due to participants’ lack of knowledge and experience on testing. 
This was another limitation. As the findings from the experience and respondent with 
specialities indicated, high availability systems and efficient server testing would have the 
potential of detecting significant problems which result in time wasted in troubleshooting 
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problems that were not documented in previous testing. This indicates that the respondents 
felt that documenting testing result was an integral part of their organisational approach. 
Therefore further research is required in order to provide a deeper insight on how sever and 
system testing is conducted and collaborates with risk approach. It can be conducted using 
different methodologies that employ in depth type of research and which focus on a larger 
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Appendix A: Research Instrument  
 
1. Demographic details 
The study was conducted at one organisation and fifteen respondents participated from the 
organisation 
a. Department 
Ten participants are from the IT department, two from corporate services, one from business 
development, one from shared services, and one from finance. 
b. Title 
These include the executive manager of Corporate Services & Operations, programme 
director of Business Development, and an account manager who is acting chief financial 
officer (CFO), business analyst, business process analyst, project manager, solution 
architect, developer, oracle support, security specialist, CIO. The participants were chosen 
based on their depth of understanding of mitigation strategies, as well as their working 
experience at the organisation. 
c. Role in the organisation  
The participant role in the organisation is as follows: 
 CIO – is in charge of information technology strategy, establishing IT framework, IT 
security policies and computer programmes required to support the organisation’s 
goals and objectives 
 Solution Architect – designs, describe and managing the solution engineering in 
relation to specific business problems. They find the best solution amongst all 
possible to solve the existing business problem. They ensure that the solution meets 




 System admin – is responsible for the upkeep, configuration, and reliable operation 
of computer systems, especially multi-user computers such as servers.  
 Project manager – is in charge of the overall responsibility for the successful 
initiation, planning, design, execution, monitoring, controlling and closure of the 
project. Key among project manager’s duties is the recognition that risk directly 
impacts the likelihood of success and that this risk must be both formally and 
informally measured and determine the most effective mitigations.  
 IT manager – in charge of business continuity and advising organisation on IT 
solutions that will be best help them grow and perform more efficiently. IT manager 
is also responsible and accountable for the smooth running of computer systems, 
servers and the maintenance of the organisation’s computing needs.  
 Developer – plays a key role in the design, installation, testing and developing of a 
software systems. The software the developer create are likely to help business be 
more efficient and provide better service.  
 Business analyst – help organisation to implement technology solution in a cost 
effective way by determining the requirements of a project or program and 
communicating them clearly to relevant stakeholders. Business analyst further define 
needs and recommending solutions that deliver value to the organisation.  
 Business process analyst – draw interferences from process details and link these 
inferences to the big picture by considering business objectives in identifying 
process improvements. Business process analyst usually meet with users, collecting 
data, researching process, analysing information and observe process in action to 
identify process improvement.   
 Oracle support – act as a single point of contact for the hosted Oracle systems and 
also responsible for the Oracle applications systems maintenance support, 




 Security specialist – safeguards information system assets by identifying and solving 
potential and actual security problems. Protects system and servers by defining 
access privileges, control structure and implement security improvements.  
 Executive manager – defines the vision and goals of the entire department. He does 
this by implementing policies and procedures, and by establishing budgets. 
Executive manager also oversee personnel decisions, and managing contracts and 
negotiations as well as analysing data to make the best business decisions. 
 Program director – maintain full responsibility over a respective department. 
Program director manages their department ensuring that tasks and objectives are 
being met. 
 CFO – makes a new investment in an organisation by improving the organisation’s 
operations and profitability. CFO controls the organisational budget, costs and 
provide a solid direction to organisation assets and investments.  
d. Experience: Number of years in position 
 Executive Managers – 10 and 12 years  
 CIO- 12 years 
 Program director – 10 years 
 CFO – 12 years  
 Solution architect – 9 years 
 System admin – 7 years 
 Project manager – 9 years 
 IT manager – 10 years 
 Developer – 9 years  
 Business analyst – 8 years 
70 
 
 Business process analyst – 8 years 
 Oracle support – 5 years 
 Security specialist – 6 years 
 
2. What factors affect how you manage risk  
The factors that affects how organisation manage its risk are Human, Organisation and 
Technological factors. 
Human factor 
 Cyber-crime - the majority of cyber-attacks take the form of phishing, where cyber 
target individuals rather than the systems. 
 Excessive system user privileges- when employees are granted default system 
privileges that exceed requirements of their job functions, these privileges are abused. 
For example, some employee whose job requires the ability to change only user 
account such as username and password, they take advantage of excessive system 
privileges and grant their colleagues to have access on systems administration.  
Organisational factor 
 Leadership style and management practice- for managers’ leadership style is even 
more influential as an individual gains rank, incompetence becomes a very real risk. 
Some managers with a hands-off management style they place an organisation at risk 
by failing to identify incompetence until is too late to correct 
 Failure to communicate – failure to communicate between departments to share their 
knowledge on risk and what risk are they currently facing.  
   Technological factor 
 Layers of redundancy – the organisation had a single layer of redundancy which had 
exposed them to system malfunctioning. That is, the servers and the infrastructure 
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had a single component in which there was no independent backup component to 
ensure system functionality continues in the event of failure.  
3. How does the organisation mitigate these risks? 
Human factor 
 Cyber-crime – To this end, the organisation trains employees in basic security 
practices such as how to recognise potential threats and what precautions to take. 
Also to stay ahead to thread landscape, the organisation leveraging both the in-house 
expertise of cyber security team in addition to the know-how of the cyber security 
vendor.   
 Excessive system user privileges – the organisation have implemented a user rights 
management as a security feature controlling which rights a user can access and what 
actions a user can perform. Therefore a system admin is granted a privilege to access 
specific function and perform a particular action, and that is being monitored 
regularly.  
Organisational factor 
 Leadership style and management practice – the organisation perform and interpret 
employee background checks persuade to the law. They conduct a human 
development skills for senior managers to ensure that leaders are competent and well 
qualified for their role.  
 Failure to communicate – project managers leads the development, documentation 
and implementation of a communication plan that identifies appropriate audience, 
establishes the communication schedule and manages the flow of information around 
the organisation. Communication plan makes it easier to say the right things in the 
right way to the relevant people using the best tools. This plan includes what needs 





 Layers of redundancy – one way to reduce the organisation’s technological risk, the 
organisations has added a layers of redundancy throughout the infrastructure. Their 
cloud infrastructure, on premises environment and server has a lines of N+1 
availability, a configuration in which multiple components have at least one 
independent backup component to ensure system functionality continues in the event 
of a failure.  
 
 
